Can insurance prove to be a deterrent against terrorism?

Overall, insurance makes terrorist attacks less damaging because if all the property and lives lost from an attack are insured, the victims will suffer no overall economic losses. Also, insurance frequently results in higher investment in security, thus hardening terrorist targets. This phenomenon is apparently widespread as it has been observed in many industries “Like in fire prevention, aviation, boiler and elevator safety where insurance generated safety improvements” (Kesan et al, 2004). Cyberinsurance is an example which is clearly illustrative of this effect of insurance on many other industries.

New insurance products may make the Internet a safer business environment because cyberinsurers can require businesses to undertake loss self-protection activities, as well as tying premiums to claims histories. … cyberinsurers can proactively tie premiums to the insured firm’s investment in security processes and create market-based incentives for e-business to increase their level of IT safety. (Kesan et al, 2004)

“In addition, the insurance companies have an incentive to monitor hackers in order to minimize the amount of damage they would have to pay out to its insured firms” (Kesan et al, 2004). Thus, insurance companies that sell insurance against terrorism, can be expected to engage in the gathering of counterterrorist intelligence; greatly aiding the state security apparatus.

References

Kesan, J.P. et al. [2004], “The economic case for cyber-insurance”, University of Illinois College of Law, Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 2, http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art2

What is the best way to approach interagency coordination, when the goal is to counter national security threats?

Effective response to national security threats calls for interagency coordination of all relevant security agencies. In particular “in the context of the military and the national security community, interagency coordination can be seen as the interaction and organizational synthesis that occur between elements of DND, other government departments and agencies, and regional and international organizations to achieve a common national security objective” (Lannan, 2004). Moreover, “To be of real benefit, the interagency coordination process must be formalized down to the operational level, and must be practiced in peacetime as well as throughout all phases of conflict” (Lannan, 2004).

In Canada, in order to facilitate interagency coordination between various security agencies, a national response center, called Government Operations Centre (GOC), has been established and granted directive powers over all relevant national security agencies. “The Government Operations Centre is designed to be the central node for communications and support so as to provide a multi-faceted source of intelligence and knowledge transfer” (Lannan, 2004). It is important to note, however, that the agencies coordinated by GOC will vary depending on their relevance to a particular incident or threat, so as to satisfy the particular operational requirements. Thus, “it is only the process of coordination that needs to be institutionalized. The asymmetrical threat that confronts us is simply too unpredictable to establish a fixed structural organization” (Lannan, 2004).

According to David Tucker (as quoted in Lannan (2004)), an effective interagency coordination process involves three elements: “It is a network disguised as a hierarchy; it incorporates different decision modes and speeds; and it has horizontal and vertical dimensions.”

Within a hierarchy, decisions can be made rapidly because of its centralized authority, whereas in a network the decision-making model can be complex and slow. The interagency coordination network is adaptable, and its flexible form makes it resilient in the asymmetric threat environment, whereas a hierarchy may be less accommodating and susceptible to partisanship. (Lannan, 2004)

References

Lannan, T. [2004], “Interagency coordination within the national security community: Improving the response to terrorism”, Canadian Military Journal Autumn, 49-56.

What are the pros and cons of information-sharing, within and between intelligence agencies?

 Information sharing threatens operational security and slows down decision making. The sharing of information regarding a planned operation, can lead to it getting into the wrong hands, and undermining the whole operation. Moreover, when different participants in the operation are informed of the whole operational plan, rather than only their particular portion of the overall plan, indecisiveness, due to unnecessary reflection on the overall structure of the operation by each participant, may result (Lannan, 2004). On the other hand, failure to share information about the overall operational plan, between all participants in the operation, may lead to an inability by all participants to coordinate their actions and successfully execute the operation. This is especially likely to happen if the circumstances under which the operation is to be executed turn out to be different from those expected (Lannan, 2004). Also, if “some security environment agencies are unsure of their counterparts’ roles, responsibilities and capabilities … [an] unnecessary duplication of effort” may result (Lannan, 2004).

References

Lannan, T. [2004], “Interagency coordination within the national security community: Improving the response to terrorism”, Canadian Military Journal Autumn, 49-56.

What security measures are required to counter the potential availability of weapons of mass destruction to transnational terrorists?

Effective security measures aimed at preventing the acquisition, manufacturing or usage of the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by terrorist groups, should include the protection of key materials, required to fabricate a WMD, from being acquired by terrorists (particularly important, in this respect, is the prevention of nuclear smuggling); increasing cooperation between regional and national police forces and intelligence agencies; and improving the effectiveness of the counterterrorism intelligence agencies by eliminating rivalries between them (especially between those within the same country) while mandating them to share information and cooperate with each other (Barnaby, 2004). 

References

Barnaby, F. (2004). How to build a nuclear bomb: and other weapons of mass destruction. New York: Nation Books.

What is the recent evolution (in terms of network connections) of British organized crime?

In the past, a British organized crime boss was the center of local operations; which meant that he was at the top of a hierarchy of local criminals through which he dominated the area (The Economist, 2004). Nowadays, Britain’s top organized criminals are masters of underground networking. Their wealth and power comes from being able to connect “illicit operators (“suppliers and clients, who may be spread over several countries”) with one another or with “overground” businesses where money can be laundered” (The Economist, 2004). 

References

The Economist (2004), “Organized crime: From godfathers to networkers”, April 1.

What is cyberterrorism?

Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorist activity; for example, politically motivated hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic damage. Concerns that terrorist groups or individuals may penetrate a nation’s electronic energy, transportation, financial or security grid or system and cause catastrophic damage (nuclear reactor or dam failure, multiple mid-air collisions or downed airliners, disrupting national economies through stock market interference, etc.) are all related to the phenomenon known as cyberterrorism (Nordeste & Carment, 2006).

References

Nordeste, B. & D. Carment (2006), “A framework for understanding terrorist use of the internet”, Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies 2006-2, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton Univ., http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1121.pdf.

Why are protection and enforcement integral parts of organized crime?

“Along the supply chain [of any illegal good] from primary producer to final consumer, however, there are a host of contractual enforcement and financing problems that have to be solved without recourse to the police, the legal system, or to mainstream financial institutions.” Hence, this need for protection and enforcement for the orderly and efficient conduct of business is filled by the organized crime groups themselves (Skaperdas, 2001). Moreover, the ability of organized crime groups “to enforce their rule within a specific geographic or economic area requires that they have the means to use force and therefore providing protection is an element common to all mafias and gangs irrespective of their other economic activities” (Skaperdas, 2001). 

References

Skaperdas, S. (2001). The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not. Economics of Governance 2, 173-202. Available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~sskaperd/SkaperdasEoG01.pdf.