Sunday, August 9, 2015
Saturday, July 11, 2015
To what extent do existing theories of civil-military relations apply in states with particular historical, ideological, social, and cultural contexts?
Western theories of civil-military relations seem to
apply quite well to Malawi during its first decade of independence. However, quite
likely, this is a result of heavy British influence prior to independence, as
well as the fact that the military of the newly independent Malawi was not much
different from the colonial military. In fact, all senior officers of the ‘new’
army were still of white, British ancestry (Mandiza, 2002). Either way, the
military of the newly independent Malawi remained politically neutral, even in
the face of political turmoil (Mandiza, 2002), since it apparently desired to
continue to follow British traditions and be under objective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). However, the first president
of the newly independent Malawi, surnamed Banda, had trouble dealing with his
political opponents, and desired political support from some kind of a paramilitary
organization that would be able to use violence or threat of violence in support
of his political goals (Mandiza, 2002). So, he created the Malawi Young
Pioneers (MYP). The MYP was a heavily
politicized organization, with strong paramilitary functions. It was
subordinate to the president alone. “Its main purpose was to ensure that
everyone conformed to party policy” (Mandiza, 2002). Thus, the MYP can be said
to have been a type of a national military organization, shaped almost
exclusively by a societal imperative,
and subject to purely subjective civilian
control (Huntington, 1957). Consequently, the MYP had a lot in common with
Hitler’s SS. After all, the SS was also a heavily politicized, paramilitary
organization, aimed at enforcing the will of the Nazi party (Wegner, 1990).
And just like the MYP, the SS was also given official status and expanded, out
of dissatisfaction with the political position of the official state military, which
initially did not wish to participate in politics, and later became opposed to
adventurous, aggressive foreign policies pursued by the Nazi government
(Huntington, 1957).
The early, post-colonial situation in the neighbouring
Mozambique also poses no problems for Western theories of civil-military
relations. The military of post-colonial Mozambique was exactly the same
organization that earlier constituted the armed wing of the liberation movement
(i.e. the war of independence that led to the end of colonial rule). Similar to
Malawi, the early, post-colonial government of Mozambique desired political
support from an organization capable of using violence or threats of violence
on its behalf (Macaringue, 2002). However, Mozambique’s post-colonial military,
despite having strong political commitments during the war of independence,
apparently had little interest in political involvement. Consequently, the
government decided to forcibly shape the military by a societal imperative, and
bring it under subjective civilian control. This was done by a “combination of
penetration by the party, political education and the provision of substantial
resources” (Macaringue, 2002). Not surprisingly, the Nazi government used very
similar tactics (in addition to others) to convert the uncooperative German
military to the Nazi point of view and make them more obedient in executing
Nazi policies (Huntington, 1957).
References
Huntington, S. P. (1957). The Soldier
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp. 1-4, 80-97, 98-141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macaringue, P. (2002). “Civil-military relations in post-Cold War
Mozambique.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams
(eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military
Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 137-151).
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Macaringue.pdf.
Mandiza, E. I.
(2002). “Civil-military relations in Malawi: An historical perspective.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams (eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations
and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 107-134). Pretoria: Institute
for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Mandiza.pdf.
Wegner, B. (1990). The
Waffen-SS: Organization, ideology, and function. Oxford:
Blackwell.
What value does the concept of strategic culture add to the study of Civil-Military Relations?
Snyder (1977) suggests that the knowledge of a
particular strategic culture allows one to better predict the behaviour and
strategic decision making, which can be expected from strategists heavily
influenced by that strategic culture. More specifically, for example,
pre-existing strategic notions, present within a particular culture, can
heavily influence the organizational and doctrinal adaptations to new
technologies, in that culture. Moreover, because strategic culture, like any
other type of culture, changes overtime; the notion of strategic culture allows
us to better understand why in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes,
certain states willingly engaged in military interventions into other states,
during some historical periods but not during others (Katzenstein, 1996). Similarly, choices between offensive and defensive
military doctrines can be better explained by examining the cultural
environment of the relevant policy makers (Kier, 1996).
Also, according to Kier (1996), the
notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why different military organizations differ in their views
of the world and their views on how they should conduct their missions in it. After
all, the unique organizational culture of every military organization strongly
influences what this military organization will perceive to be in its interest.
So, how do these ideas play out in
practice?
The strategic culture, of the US
during the Cold War, seems to provide a good example. In effect, this strategic
culture was started by one intellectual, and due to favourable political
circumstances, quickly spread, and came to influence all of US strategic
thinking throughout the Cold War. Thus,
in 1946, an expert on military affairs, named Bernard Brodie, concluded that
the invention of nuclear weapons made war impermissible. So, he thought that
the new military strategy could only consist of the prevention of war through
the threat of force – an idea which came to be called the deterrence doctrine (Bacevich, 2005). This idea clearly produced a whole new strategic culture.
After all, it led to the creation of a new profession, whose practitioners came
to be called defense intellectuals. And it led to the creation of new, highly
influential institutions, such as the RAND Corporation. Not surprisingly, the
defense intellectuals working in these institutions produced a vast body of
highly influential literature, largely focused on various aspects of Brodie’s
deterrence strategy (Bacevich, 2005).
Finally, it seems reasonable to believe that a strategic idea, which was
incorrect, would be quickly discarded, unless it gave rise to a whole strategic
culture. If so, then Brodie’s deterrence strategy did indeed give rise to a new
strategic culture, because even after the battlefields of the 1950s and 1960s
proved that Brodie was wrong, the defense intellectuals continued to pretend
otherwise and to work on various aspects of strategy, which still assumed that
non-nuclear war is no longer possible, or at least, is of little consequence (Bacevich, 2005).
References
Bacevich, A. J. (2005). The New
American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katzenstein, P., (ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp.
1-78). New York: Columbia University Press.
Kier, E.
(1996). “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II.” In: P.
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 186-215). New
York: Columbia University Press.
Snyder, J. L. (1977). The
Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Available at http://bit.ly/1hKoWGH.
Does the military have a right to be different from, or a need to be reflective of, the society which it serves?
According to Max Weber, the armed
forces can be most effective only when the rational, functional discipline of
the military (which would stem from its organizational objectives) overrides
the military professional’s identification with and loyalties to the civilian
society. Consequently, Weber thought that this military discipline should erase
the civilian habits of behaviour in recruits while turning them into soldiers
(Rosen, 1996). Thus, Max Weber was clearly of the view that the military not
only has the right to be different from the civilian society; but it actually should
be different from the civilian society, and can only get harmed by attempting
to reflect it in any way. However, perhaps Weber’s, just described, statements
on the matter, were too broad, and would prove to be inappropriate, or at
least, too simplistic, when one starts to analyse specific aspects of the
military profession.
Thus, according to Ficarrotta (1997),
if the armed forces are to effectively perform their function, military
professionals should both be bound by special moral obligations not binding on
civilians, and strictly follow all those moral obligations that apply to
civilians. Hence, based on this line of thought, at least when it comes to its
morals, the military clearly has the right to be different from the civilian
part of society, even though civilian morals should form an important part of
the military moral code.
However, according to Ficarrotta
(1997), there are reasons to believe that the effectiveness of the armed forces
will not suffer if military professionals who follow all moral obligations,
required of a military professional, on duty, do not follow some or all of
these moral obligations while off duty. This suggests that the military has the
right to and should be morally different from the civilian society, while it is
performing its functions. However, the people, who collectively form the armed
forces, need not be morally different from civilians, whenever they aren’t
functioning as part of the armed forces.
On the other hand, according to
Ficarrotta (1997), it is possible that if military professionals always follow
their professional military obligations in all contexts, the moral image of the
military, in the eyes of the public, will be higher; which will contribute to a
greater support for the military by the public. Also, highly moral soldiers are
more likely to go above and beyond the call of duty if they believe that their
military leaders are exceptionally moral. Hence, these arguments suggest that
military professionals should follow the military moral code both while they
are on duty and while they are off duty in their civilian roles; suggesting
that all component parts of the military have the right to and should be morally
different from the civilian society which they serve, in all cases.
References
Ficarrotta, J. C. (1997). “Are Military Professionals Bound by a
Higher Moral Standard?” Armed Forces and
Society, 24(1): 59-75.
Rosen, S. P. (1996). Societies
and Military Power: India and its Armies (pp. 1-32). Cornell, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Do Civil-Military Relations (CMR) constitute a partnership?
According to Feaver (2003), CMR is clearly not a
partnership. Instead it is a hierarchical relationship, involving strategic
interaction, in which civilians hire the military to protect their society from
enemies. Hence, according to Feaver (2003), CMR is just one variety of a common
employer-employee relationship, which is called the principal-agent framework
by the economists. This type of a relationship carries a number of challenging
problems for the participants, and, as a result, is characterized by strategic
interaction. For example, the employer wants to hire a diligent worker.
However, every not-so-diligent worker wants to get hired, and hence will go to
great lengths to present himself as being very diligent, during the selection
process. Also, every employer wants to get the most amount of work for the
least amount of pay, out of his/her employee; while every employee wants to be
paid the largest amount of money for doing the least amount of work. Hence, the
interests of the civilian employer and the military employee are in direct
opposition. This leads to both sides constantly attempting to fool one another;
while simultaneously demanding more from each other, and attempting to force
each other to keep all promises (Feaver, 2003).
On the other hand, Bland (1999) apparently believes
that CMR is a partnership. In fact, according to him, civilian leaders and
military officers share responsibility for the civilian control of the
military. Specifically, both groups of leaders are responsible and accountable
for their respective aspects of civilian control over the military. Bland
(1999) supports this idea by asserting that empirical evidence on CMR
demonstrates that military experts, not only direct military operations and
provide technical advice to civilian leaders; but they also assist civilian
leaders in controlling the armed forces. Moreover, even in mature liberal
democracies, military leaders are expected to engage in joint decision-making
with civilian leaders, regarding national defense and the use of armed forces
(Bland, 1999).
At least when it comes to the CMR in the modern United
States, I am inclined to side with Bland (1999), rather than Feaver (2003),
because I agree with Mills (1956). Mills sees three dominant sources of power
over the modern US: the political order, the military order, and the economy
(dominated by several hundred huge, interrelated corporations). And according
to him, the decisions taken by the US military, both rest upon and have a
serious effect on the political life of the US and its economy. Moreover, Mills
(1956) argues that American generals and admirals hold positions of decisive
political and economic relevance, and have many interests in common with the
political leaders of the visible government and the corporate rich. All of this
suggests that CMR is an egalitarian, collaborative relationship between the
military and the two types of civilian leaders.
References
Bland, D. L. (1999). “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.”
Armed Forces and Society, 26(1): 7-26.
Feaver, P. (2003). Armed
Servants (pp. 54-117). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mills, C. W. (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wednesday, July 8, 2015
Are the two imperatives of the armed forces actually all that different?
The two imperatives of the armed forces do appear to
be very different. For a start, their sources are completely different. While
the functional imperative stems from the threats to the society’s security; it
is the various ideologies, social forces, and the institutions dominant within
the society, that determine the societal imperative (Huntington, 1957).
Moreover, if the two imperatives were similar, it would seem reasonable to
expect there to be societies whose military institutions have been shaped by
only one of these imperatives. However, there is no evidence of such societies;
and there are good reasons for that. In fact, military institutions, which are
shaped only by social values, are unlikely to be capable of effectively dealing
with threats to the society’s security. Similarly, military institutions that
have been shaped only by functional imperatives are unlikely to remain stable
within, and cooperate with, any civilian society (Huntington, 1957).
It is interesting to note that the armed forces have
persistently intervened in the politics of many different countries of the past
and present. And their interventions were usually decisive and led to the
establishment of military rule in those countries (Finer, 1962). These
phenomena may indicate multiple instances of armed forces shaped primarily by
the functional imperative; whether because the political intervention was
carried out because the civilian authorities were seen as being incapable of
securing the society, or because the various ideologies, social forces, and the
institutions dominant within the society were deemed inappropriate by the military,
which desired to change them in accordance with its vision.
But why should the armed forces be at risk of having
social values that are different from the larger society? Don’t all members of
the military get inculcated with civilian social values long before they join
the military? First, unlike many forms of civilian organization, the military
is a purposive instrument, rationally conceived and aimed at fulfilling certain
objectives – in particular, fighting and winning wars (Finer, 1962). Second, to
help fulfill this purpose, every military has five main features: (1) It has a
centralized command. (2) It is hierarchically organized. (3) All of its members
are subject to discipline. (4) It is connected by its own communication
network. (5) It has its own, unique, epirit
de corps, with its corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency of the
military. These five features make the armed forces much more highly organized,
and hence distinct, from any civilian organizations; while its fifth feature - epirit de corps – imparts and sustains in
military professionals uniquely military social values, which may even lead to
contempt for civilians (Finer, 1962).
References
Finer, S. E. (1962). The Man
on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (pp. 1-22). London:
Pinter.
Huntington, S. P. (1957). “Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military
Relations.” In: S. P. Huntington, The
Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp.
1-4). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How has the political evolution of the state influenced the role of the armed forces?
Political evolution of human societies gradually led
to the emergence of states. The first states were necessarily agrarian, and
according to Mann (1993), agrarian states used at least ¾ of their revenue to
fund wars. So, as a result, their military personnel greatly outnumbered their
civilian officials and made state-societies look like war-making machines.
Mann’s (1986) analysis of power suggests that the
emergence of what he classifies as authoritative, intensive form of power (i.e.
concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized) in the armed forces (where such
form of power was clearly very useful) likely led to its widespread adoption by
the states; in no small measure because the armies which were ruled by this
form of power proved to be superior to others, and thus strengthened their
parent states. Thus, it can be argued, based on Mann’s (1986) analysis, that
the evolution of armed forces influenced the political role and functions of
the state, not just the other way around. In addition, according to Mann
(1993), many radical changes in the political structure and role of the state
(i.e. revolutions) would not have taken place without the assistance of
military factions, whose vision of their role in society, it can be argued, has,
at that time, changed toward a more radical position.
According to Mann (1993), the emergence of modern
states led to the formal monopolization of military violence by these states. But
instead of ending the autonomy of military power, this change led to the
redirection of military power through state’s formal organizations. Thus, rapid political evolution of European
states during early modern period led, by the 18th century, to the
centralization of the military under a high command, which in turn, fell under
the formal control of the state’s chief executive. Also, the start of the
Second Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 19th century turned
militaries into customers of industrial capitalism (Mann, 1993). At the same
time, these developments can be linked to Mann’s (1993) observation of those
militaries developing technocratic self-confidence, and to their skills
becoming removed from everyday controls and social practices. All of this, in
turn, may have led to what Mann (1993) describes as militaries becoming
insulated, caste-like, within the state, developing segmental discipline over
their mass armies, and starting to recruit their lower ranks from lower social
classes (Mann, 1993).
It can be argued, based on Mann’s (1993) analysis,
that the political evolution of the state gradually led to the near autonomy in
actual function (despite formal integration) of various branches of the modern
state. Given this, it should not be surprising that during the later years of
the Cold War, the military could act autonomously and terminate the state and even
the world, as Mann (1993) argues it could.
References
Mann, M. (1986). “Societies as organized power networks.” In: M. Mann,
The Sources of Social Power: Volume I: A
history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760 (pp.1-33). Cambridge: CUP.
Available at http://bit.ly/1kwZELI.
Mann, M. (1993). “A theory of the modern state.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume II: The
rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914 (pp. 44-91). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1mbDKh7.
How do theories of civil-military relations help us understand actual civil-military relations?
As Jorgensen’s (2010) discussion suggests, a theory of civil-military
relations can function as a helpful guide for conducting research on actual
civil-military relations. It can function as a device for interpreting data on
actual civil-military relations, helping us understand the symbolic dimensions
of this data, and put it into perspective. Also, Jorgensen argues that theories of civil-military
relations can lead us to question our personal views on actual civil-military
relations, and force us to see that there are different ways of seeing the same
actual civil-military relations. In addition, a theory of civil-military
relations helps us to determine which data on actual civil-military relations
is important for our purposes and which data is not, thus functioning as a
simplifying device. Also, according to Jorgensen, a theory of civil-military
relations helps us identify existing aspects of the actual civil-military
relations, suggests how we can know about them, as well as telling us what we
should ‘make of them.’
Cox
(1981) divides all theories into ‘problem-solving theories’ and ‘critical
theories.’ A problem-solving theory starts with the assumption of permanence of
the institutions and social and power relations that exist in the world, and
then proceeds to analyze any phenomena of interest which are known to be
constantly changing. Hence, a problem-solving theory of civil-military
relations would reduce the statement, about a particular aspect of actual
civil-military relations, to a limited number of variables which can be
analyzed fairly closely and precisely; and hence, would allow us to deduce laws
or regularities about the workings of actual civil-military relations.
On the
other hand, according to Cox’s dichotomy, a critical theory of civil-military
relations, would not take the institutions and social and power relations,
inherent in actual civil-military relations, for granted, and would instead concern
itself with their origins, as well as ways in which they may be changing and
how they may be changing. Moreover, a critical theory of civil-military
relations would construct a larger picture of the whole, of which the
particular aspect of actual civil-military relations analyzed by the
problem-solving theory is just one component.
References
Cox, R. W. (1981). “Social
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium, 10(2):126-155. Available at http://bit.ly/1t8NEnG.
Jorgensen, K. E. (2010).
“Why Theorize International Relations?” In: K. E. Jorgensen, International Relations Theory: A New
Introduction (pp. 6-32). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Saturday, July 4, 2015
Why do we demand critical infrastructure security?
We demand
the security of critical infrastructure because “disrupting its function would
lead to a significant socio-economic crisis with the potential to undermine the
stability of a society and thereby cause political, strategic, and security
consequences.” More specifically, critical infrastructure is protected because (1)
it may carry a symbolic importance; (2) there is an immediate dependence on it;
and (3) it is subject to complex dependencies (Tabansky, 2011).
When it
comes to the symbolic importance of the critical infrastructure, “several
democratic countries include heritage sites, museums, archives, and monuments
among critical infrastructures that should be protected” (Tabansky, 2011). The
symbolic importance of the infrastructure may also come from the real or
perceived power it provides to the government. “For example, a hostile
disruption of traditional media used by the state for communicating with its
citizens will immediately harm the government’s ability to function. Moreover,
in the longer term, such disruption may diminish the citizens’ confidence in
the existing government, or even the general form of government or regime” (Tabansky,
2011).
A good
example of a critical infrastructure on which there is an immediate dependence
is “the electricity grid or telecommunications network, which is … [essential] for most processes in society.”
More narrowly, “Cyberspace is a representative example of an infrastructure
that has become critical because of the interface of most of society’s activity
with computerized communications networks” (Tabansky, 2011).
Critical
infrastructure is also subject to complex dependencies, because “The
relationships among various infrastructures are presumably not fully known, and
the failure of one component is liable to cause a wide range of results and
damage.” There are three types of failure stemming from complex dependencies of
infrastructures: common cause failure, cascading failure, and escalating
failure (Tabansky, 2011). Common cause failure could include “various
facilities (fuel storage, airports, and power stations) that are located in
geographic proximity are likely to be harmed from a single incident of flooding.”
In the case of cascading failure “Disruption of a control system in one
infrastructure (for example, water) leads to disruption of a second
infrastructure (for example, in transportation, the flooding of a railway
line), and then a third (for example, food supply chain) and so on.” While
under escalating failure “Disruption of one infrastructure (for example, a
communications network) harms the effort to fix other infrastructures that have
been damaged by another entity (emergency services, commerce)” (Tabansky,
2011).
References
Tabansky, I. [2011], “Critical
Infrastructure Protection against Cyber Threats”, Military and Strategic Affairs 3(2), 61-78, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1326273687.pdf
What are the security threats emanating from space ?
Since some
form and quantity of security is required for consumption of all goods and
services, security is a necessary complement to all goods and services. Thus,
some form and quantity of space security is required for our continued
consumption of goods and services on Earth (because insecurities in space can
adversely affect the security on Earth), as well as for our emerging ability to
“consume” the opportunities offered by space. And space is not free of security
problems. Space debris can spiral to Earth and/or interfere with or damage
someone’s spacecraft; while the absence of space traffic laws and regulations
can result in collisions of spacecrafts, and satellites that are important for
Earthly telecommunication, surveillance, etc. (UNIDIR, 2008). The absence of
space governance and property rights can adversely affect our ability to
exploit the resources offered by space; while weaponization of space and the
potential for space-based military conflicts presents a grave danger to people
and property, both in space and on Earth (UNIDIR, 2008).
Security is
also an uncertain good as security-breaches are irregular and unpredictable.
Consequently, risk-averse individuals tend to demand insurance against
unpredictable security breaches. This insurance can take the form of some kind
of preventive measures and/or after-the-fact compensation. When
it comes to space security, most preventive measures to date appear to be
limited to developing laws, regulations, and agreements regarding the usage of space;
as UNIDIR’s (2008) conference report seems to demonstrate. While, with regards
to after-the-fact compensation, most spacecraft has probably been insured since
the start of space age in 1960s; if only because of its high failure rate in
operations.
References
United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (2008, 31 March - 1 April 2008). Security in Space: The Next Generation -
Conference Report. Available at http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/security-in-space-the-next-generation-conference-report-31-march-1-april-2008-342.pdf
What are the short-run prevention measures to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia?
One proposed
solution, to the piracy off the coast of Somalia, consists of a military land
intervention by an international community. “… a series of small military
operations could be carried out in order to identify, pacify and contain the
elements of concern. … by addressing piracy groups on an individual basis” (Kunertova,
D. et al., 2010). However, this type of
Military
intervention brings with it the likelihood of casualties, whether they are
pirate or civilian … a single Somalian casualty would be fiercely avenged by
the individual clans and sub clan alliances. This would essentially tip the
delicately balanced system Puntland has established into a state of potential
anarchy, it would provide an excuse for elements such as Al-Shabab to enter Puntland
under the guise of resistance and further destabilize the area. (Kunertova, D.
et al., 2010)
Hence, if it
is to have any chance of success, a military intervention “has to be undertaken
by the Somali Puntland authorities themselves” (Kunertova, D. et al.,
2010).
Another way
to counter the piracy threat would be to further enhance the naval protection
in the region. However, this may not suffice as “Pirates are [already] operating far away off the
coastline from Somalia and because of growing financial capabilities via ransom
and advanced technologies, the operational area of pirates has enlarged to an
unknown area” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).
“An often, especially from
practice, suggested solution to encounter the piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden
is the involvement of the private sector. … The concept provides that
commercial vessels are protected by professional trained and well equipped
teams. Ideally the sole presence of those teams should deter potential
attackers.” But again, there is a risk that pirates will shift their attacks
towards poorly protected ships, as all ships passing through the Gulf of Aden
cannot be expected to hire private security (Kunertova, D. et al.,
2010).
References
Kunertova,
D. et al. (2010). “European Anti-piracy Strategy: Somalian Piracy: Today’s
Challenge Addressed by an EU Initiative”, Dresden Technical University, New
Dimensions of Security in Europe, http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/zentrale_einrichtungen/zis/newseceu/outcomes/papers_folder/MilSec_EU%20anti-piracy%20strategy.pdf
What are the factors generating demand for anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia?
Piracy is
foremost a national security threat (regional security, illicit trade, loss of
revenue from reduced ship traffic, environmental threat): it is the Somalian
state that bears the greatest cost as a result of their actions. Nearly 4
million Somalis depend on food donations to survive and not every ship carrying
food is able to afford having an armed escort, therefore attacks by Somali
pirates could eventually lead to a greater threat of widespread starvation than
the state is already experiencing. (Kunertova, D. et
al., 2010)
“Somali
piracy not only disrupts the trade throughout the region, but also increases
the overall price of international commerce going through the Gulf to Western
states”
(Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).
“Piracy off
the coast of Somalia has more than doubled in 2008; so far over 60 ships have
been attacked. Pirates are regularly demanding and receiving million-dollar
ransom payments and are becoming more aggressive and assertive” (Middleton,
2008).
“The
international community must be aware of the danger that Somali pirates could
become agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransoms
is helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US
terror-listed Al-Shabaab” (Middleton, 2008).
To some
within the [Somali] community, the
pirates are amoral thugs bringing yet more trouble to their shores. … The town of Eyl [is] Somalia's
modern-day pirate capital … Mohammed Khalif,
one of the town's Islamic leaders, says … “They [the
pirates] have troubled us a lot. They have
brought us alcohol, commercial sex workers and massive inflation. Lots of
killings also take place here.” … Abdirahman
Mohamed Mahmoud, Puntland's regional president, took office in January on an
anti-piracy platform. He says fighting the pirates is high on his agenda.
… Religious
leaders from all over Puntland have also embarked on a mission to battle the
buccaneers. And what better place to try to reform pirates than in Eyl. At the
town square they hold an assembly. Their sermons focus on the vices the pirates
have introduced with the money they earn. (Adow, 2009)
References
Adow,
M. (2009, June 17). “The Pirate Kings of Puntland,” Al Jazeera English. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/06/2009614125245860630.html.
Kunertova,
D. et al. (2010). “European Anti-piracy Strategy: Somalian Piracy: Today’s
Challenge Addressed by an EU Initiative”, Dresden Technical University, New
Dimensions of Security in Europe, http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/zentrale_einrichtungen/zis/newseceu/outcomes/papers_folder/MilSec_EU%20anti-piracy%20strategy.pdf
Middleton,
R. (2008). Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Briefing
Paper. Chatham House. Available
at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/1008piracysomalia.pdf
What are the role and importance of leadership in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)?
Leadership by
a certain nation or nations clearly plays an important role in the
proliferation or non-proliferation of WMDs. This happens in no small part
because “National interests, balance-of power considerations, and alliance
commitments always override international treaty commitments.” Thus, “While
Russia helped China’s and Iran’s nuclear programs” in the past; the US, as of
2006, was “seen as lacking both the clout and the credibility to build a broad
international coalition that would dissuade countries from going nuclear”
(Malik, 2006). On the other hand, “China has long used nuclear and missile
proliferation to pressure the United States to curb its arms sales to Taiwan
and contain its Asian rivals (Japan and India) by arming North Korea and
Pakistan”; who in turn started to proliferate WMD technology to ‘tertiary’ “nuclear
aspirants (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Burma)” (Malik, 2006).
References
Malik,
M. (2006). “WMD Proliferation: The Nexus between State, Nonstate, and Antistate
Actors.” In Lloyd, R. M. (Ed.) Economics
and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century (pp. 91-102).
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
What is the function/purpose of intelligence agencies?
… By virtue of their control over secret
information, intelligence agencies are ideally suited to provide comprehensive
strategic analyses for policymakers. “The intelligence community,” writes
Richard Betts, “is the logical set of institutions to provide what one may call
the library function for national security: it keeps track of all sources,
secret or not, and mobilizes them in coherent form whenever nonexpert
policymakers call for them.” (Rovner, 2011, p. 4)
… How should we
measure progress in the war on terrorism? How do we know if we are winning or
losing? How do we wage counterinsurgency campaigns against elusive and amorphous
enemies? How do we understand the increasingly complex relationships between
nation-states, armed groups, and transnational actors? What are the long-term
goals of resurgent great powers like Russia and China? How close are states
like Iran to acquiring nuclear weapons? What do they intend to do with them? (Rovner,
2011, p. vii)
Intelligence
agencies exist to grapple with questions like these. They collect a staggering
amount of information, synthesize reports from secret and open sources, and try
to distill it into digestible analytical products for policymakers, diplomats,
and military officers. When all goes well, intelligence estimates play an
important role in strategic judgement, adding unique kinds of information and
insight to help leaders cope with the inherent uncertainty and complexity of
international politics. (Rovner, 2011, p. vii)
References
Rovner, J. (2011). Fixing the Facts: National Security and the
Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Why does demand for intelligence exist?
In the ideal, intelligence contributes
to rational state action by providing unique kinds of information to policy
makers and by helping organize an enormous amount of data from secret and open
sources. … Policymakers need intelligence to provide information, mitigate
ambiguity, and reduce the amount of uncertainty in the decision making process.
Wartime leaders have a special interest in knowing the disposition of enemy
forces, but peacetime statesmen also benefit from intelligence when it
identifies looming dangers as well as opportunities for diplomacy. (Rovner,
2011, p. 4)
References
Rovner, J. (2011). Fixing the Facts: National Security and the
Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
What factors led to Canada’s continued involvement in the US-led military operations in Afghanistan?
“Canada had a real
and vital interest in destroying the haven and base that Afghanistan had become
from which international terrorists could continue to attack the West,
including Canada itself” (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2008).
However, Canada continued its military commitment in Afghanistan after the
Taliban were removed from power, and various transnational terrorist groups
lost their Afghan training camps. This happened in part because the Canadian
government was eager to please Americans by demonstrating that Canada is still
a good military ally, despite its refusal to participate in US led invasion of
Iraq (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2008). CF’s continued action in Afghanistan also
took place for other important reasons.
Recent Canadian governments
and many Canadians have continued to see terrorism that arises from radical
Islam as a threat to Canada and believe that Canada has a significant national
interest in stopping it from retaking Afghanistan. ... ‘An increasingly interdependent
world has tightened the links between international and domestic security and
developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways.
Today’s front lines stretch from the streets of Kabul to the rail lines of
Madrid to our own Canadian cities.’ (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2008)
Canada’s war in Afghanistan
is also closely linked to what is being called the ‘transformation’ of the
Canadian military, the personally initiated project of the energetic Chief of
the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier … He has had unprecedented leeway and
influence as chief and indeed has seized the moment by using the war in
Afghanistan and the government’s commitment there as the occasion to press for
major changes and acquisitions which in normal circumstances would have been
both delayed and/or scaled back by the political leadership. Hillier’s
‘transformation agenda’ for the Canadian armed forces has included more
personnel and equipment, improved infrastructure and changes to training and
the command structure. (Jockel &
Sokolsky, 2008)
Thus, CF’s continued involvement in Afghanistan can,
in part, be blamed on Hillier, who easily succumbed to the typical trappings of
a high ranking bureaucratic position, and successfully managed to increase the
size of his bureau, its budget, and all the benefits that come with it.
References
Jockel,
J. and Sokolsky, J. (2008). Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man
Out Steps Forward. Journal of Transatlantic
Studies, 6(1):100-115.
Tuesday, June 16, 2015
Can insurance prove to be a deterrent against terrorism?
Overall, insurance makes
terrorist attacks less damaging because if all the property and lives lost from
an attack are insured, the victims will suffer no overall economic losses. Also,
insurance frequently results in higher investment in security, thus hardening
terrorist targets. This phenomenon is apparently widespread as it has been
observed in many industries “Like in fire prevention, aviation, boiler and
elevator safety where insurance generated safety improvements” (Kesan et al,
2004). Cyberinsurance is an example which is clearly illustrative of this
effect of insurance on many other industries.
New insurance products may make the
Internet a safer business environment because cyberinsurers can require
businesses to undertake loss self-protection activities, as well as tying
premiums to claims histories. … cyberinsurers can proactively tie premiums to
the insured firm’s investment in security processes and create market-based
incentives for e-business to increase their level of IT safety. (Kesan et al,
2004)
“In
addition, the insurance companies have an incentive to monitor hackers in order
to minimize the amount of damage they would have to pay out to its insured
firms” (Kesan et al, 2004). Thus,
insurance companies that sell insurance against terrorism, can be expected to
engage in the gathering of counterterrorist intelligence; greatly aiding the
state security apparatus.
References
Kesan, J.P. et al. [2004],
“The economic case for cyber-insurance”, University of Illinois College of Law,
Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 2, http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art2
What is the best way to approach interagency coordination, when the goal is to counter national security threats?
Effective response to national
security threats calls for interagency coordination of all relevant security
agencies. In particular “in the context of the military and the national
security community, interagency coordination can be seen as the interaction and
organizational synthesis that occur between elements of DND, other government
departments and agencies, and regional and international organizations to achieve
a common national security objective” (Lannan, 2004). Moreover, “To be of real
benefit, the interagency coordination process must be formalized down to
the operational level, and must be practiced
in peacetime as well as throughout all phases of conflict” (Lannan, 2004).
In Canada, in order to facilitate interagency coordination between various security agencies, a national response center, called Government Operations Centre (GOC), has been established and granted directive powers over all relevant national security agencies. “The Government Operations Centre is designed to be the central node for communications and support so as to provide a multi-faceted source of intelligence and knowledge transfer” (Lannan, 2004). It is important to note, however, that the agencies coordinated by GOC will vary depending on their relevance to a particular incident or threat, so as to satisfy the particular operational requirements. Thus, “it is only the process of coordination that needs to be institutionalized. The asymmetrical threat that confronts us is simply too unpredictable to establish a fixed structural organization” (Lannan, 2004).
According to David Tucker (as quoted in Lannan (2004)), an effective interagency coordination process involves three elements: “It is a network disguised as a hierarchy; it incorporates different decision modes and speeds; and it has horizontal and vertical dimensions.”
Within a hierarchy, decisions can be made rapidly because of its centralized authority, whereas in a network the decision-making model can be complex and slow. The interagency coordination network is adaptable, and its flexible form makes it resilient in the asymmetric threat environment, whereas a hierarchy may be less accommodating and susceptible to partisanship. (Lannan, 2004)
References
Lannan, T. [2004], “Interagency coordination within the national security community: Improving the response to terrorism”, Canadian Military Journal Autumn, 49-56.
What are the pros and cons of information-sharing, within and between intelligence agencies?
Information sharing threatens
operational security and slows down decision making. The sharing of information
regarding a planned operation, can lead to it getting into the wrong hands, and
undermining the whole operation. Moreover, when different participants in the
operation are informed of the whole operational plan, rather than only their
particular portion of the overall plan, indecisiveness, due to unnecessary
reflection on the overall structure of the operation by each participant, may
result (Lannan, 2004). On the other hand, failure to share information about
the overall operational plan, between all participants in the operation, may
lead to an inability by all participants to coordinate their actions and
successfully execute the operation. This is especially likely to happen if the
circumstances under which the operation is to be executed turn out to be
different from those expected (Lannan, 2004). Also, if “some security environment agencies are unsure of their
counterparts’ roles, responsibilities and capabilities … [an] unnecessary duplication of effort” may result (Lannan,
2004).
References
Lannan, T. [2004],
“Interagency coordination within the national security community: Improving the
response to terrorism”, Canadian Military Journal Autumn, 49-56.
Saturday, June 13, 2015
What security measures are required to counter the potential availability of weapons of mass destruction to transnational terrorists?
Effective security measures aimed
at preventing the acquisition, manufacturing or usage of the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by terrorist
groups, should include the protection of key materials, required to fabricate a
WMD, from being acquired by terrorists (particularly important, in this
respect, is the prevention of nuclear smuggling); increasing cooperation
between regional and national police forces and intelligence agencies; and
improving the effectiveness of the counterterrorism intelligence agencies by
eliminating rivalries between them (especially between those within the same
country) while mandating them to share information and cooperate with each
other (Barnaby, 2004).
References
Barnaby, F. (2004). How to build a nuclear bomb: and other weapons of mass destruction. New York: Nation Books.
What is the recent evolution (in terms of network connections) of British organized crime?
In the past, a British organized
crime boss was the center of local operations; which meant that he was at the
top of a hierarchy of local criminals through which he dominated the area (The
Economist, 2004). Nowadays, Britain’s top organized criminals are masters of
underground networking. Their wealth and power comes from being able to connect
“illicit operators (“suppliers and clients, who may be spread over several
countries”) with one another or with “overground” businesses where money can be
laundered” (The Economist, 2004).
References
The Economist (2004), “Organized crime:
From godfathers to networkers”, April 1.
What is cyberterrorism?
Cyberterrorism
is
the convergence of cyberspace and terrorist activity; for example, politically
motivated hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life
or severe economic damage. Concerns that terrorist groups or individuals may
penetrate a nation’s electronic energy, transportation, financial or security
grid or system and cause catastrophic damage (nuclear reactor or dam failure,
multiple mid-air collisions or downed airliners, disrupting national economies
through stock market interference, etc.) are all related to the phenomenon
known as cyberterrorism (Nordeste & Carment, 2006).
References
Nordeste, B. & D. Carment (2006),
“A framework for understanding terrorist use of the internet”, Canadian Centre
for Intelligence and Security Studies 2006-2, The Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs, Carleton Univ., http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1121.pdf.
Why are protection and enforcement integral parts of organized crime?
“Along the supply chain [of any illegal good] from primary
producer to final consumer, however, there are a host of contractual
enforcement and financing problems that have to be solved without recourse to the
police, the legal system, or to mainstream financial institutions.” Hence, this
need for protection and enforcement for the orderly and efficient conduct of
business is filled by the organized crime groups themselves (Skaperdas, 2001).
Moreover, the ability of organized crime groups “to enforce their rule within a
specific geographic or economic area requires that they have the means to use
force and therefore providing protection is an element common to all mafias and
gangs irrespective of their other economic activities” (Skaperdas, 2001).
References
Skaperdas,
S. (2001). The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when
the state does not. Economics of Governance 2, 173-202. Available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~sskaperd/SkaperdasEoG01.pdf.
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