To what extent do existing theories of civil-military relations apply in states with particular historical, ideological, social, and cultural contexts?

Western theories of civil-military relations seem to apply quite well to Malawi during its first decade of independence. However, quite likely, this is a result of heavy British influence prior to independence, as well as the fact that the military of the newly independent Malawi was not much different from the colonial military. In fact, all senior officers of the ‘new’ army were still of white, British ancestry (Mandiza, 2002). Either way, the military of the newly independent Malawi remained politically neutral, even in the face of political turmoil (Mandiza, 2002), since it apparently desired to continue to follow British traditions and be under objective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). However, the first president of the newly independent Malawi, surnamed Banda, had trouble dealing with his political opponents, and desired political support from some kind of a paramilitary organization that would be able to use violence or threat of violence in support of his political goals (Mandiza, 2002). So, he created the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP).  The MYP was a heavily politicized organization, with strong paramilitary functions. It was subordinate to the president alone. “Its main purpose was to ensure that everyone conformed to party policy” (Mandiza, 2002). Thus, the MYP can be said to have been a type of a national military organization, shaped almost exclusively by a societal imperative, and subject to purely subjective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). Consequently, the MYP had a lot in common with Hitler’s SS. After all, the SS was also a heavily politicized, paramilitary organization, aimed at enforcing the will of the Nazi party (Wegner, 1990). And just like the MYP, the SS was also given official status and expanded, out of dissatisfaction with the political position of the official state military, which initially did not wish to participate in politics, and later became opposed to adventurous, aggressive foreign policies pursued by the Nazi government (Huntington, 1957).

The early, post-colonial situation in the neighbouring Mozambique also poses no problems for Western theories of civil-military relations. The military of post-colonial Mozambique was exactly the same organization that earlier constituted the armed wing of the liberation movement (i.e. the war of independence that led to the end of colonial rule). Similar to Malawi, the early, post-colonial government of Mozambique desired political support from an organization capable of using violence or threats of violence on its behalf (Macaringue, 2002). However, Mozambique’s post-colonial military, despite having strong political commitments during the war of independence, apparently had little interest in political involvement. Consequently, the government decided to forcibly shape the military by a societal imperative, and bring it under subjective civilian control. This was done by a “combination of penetration by the party, political education and the provision of substantial resources” (Macaringue, 2002). Not surprisingly, the Nazi government used very similar tactics (in addition to others) to convert the uncooperative German military to the Nazi point of view and make them more obedient in executing Nazi policies (Huntington, 1957).   

References

Huntington, S. P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp. 1-4, 80-97, 98-141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Macaringue, P. (2002). “Civil-military relations in post-Cold War Mozambique.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams (eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 137-151). Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Macaringue.pdf.

Mandiza, E. I. (2002). “Civil-military relations in Malawi: An historical perspective.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams (eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 107-134). Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Mandiza.pdf.  

Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS: Organization, ideology, and function. Oxford: Blackwell.

What value does the concept of strategic culture add to the study of Civil-Military Relations?

Snyder (1977) suggests that the knowledge of a particular strategic culture allows one to better predict the behaviour and strategic decision making, which can be expected from strategists heavily influenced by that strategic culture. More specifically, for example, pre-existing strategic notions, present within a particular culture, can heavily influence the organizational and doctrinal adaptations to new technologies, in that culture. Moreover, because strategic culture, like any other type of culture, changes overtime; the notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes, certain states willingly engaged in military interventions into other states, during some historical periods but not during others (Katzenstein, 1996). Similarly, choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines can be better explained by examining the cultural environment of the relevant policy makers (Kier, 1996). 

Also, according to Kier (1996), the notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why different military organizations differ in their views of the world and their views on how they should conduct their missions in it. After all, the unique organizational culture of every military organization strongly influences what this military organization will perceive to be in its interest.

So, how do these ideas play out in practice?

The strategic culture, of the US during the Cold War, seems to provide a good example. In effect, this strategic culture was started by one intellectual, and due to favourable political circumstances, quickly spread, and came to influence all of US strategic thinking throughout the Cold War.  Thus, in 1946, an expert on military affairs, named Bernard Brodie, concluded that the invention of nuclear weapons made war impermissible. So, he thought that the new military strategy could only consist of the prevention of war through the threat of force – an idea which came to be called the deterrence doctrine (Bacevich, 2005). This idea clearly produced a whole new strategic culture. After all, it led to the creation of a new profession, whose practitioners came to be called defense intellectuals. And it led to the creation of new, highly influential institutions, such as the RAND Corporation. Not surprisingly, the defense intellectuals working in these institutions produced a vast body of highly influential literature, largely focused on various aspects of Brodie’s deterrence strategy (Bacevich, 2005). Finally, it seems reasonable to believe that a strategic idea, which was incorrect, would be quickly discarded, unless it gave rise to a whole strategic culture. If so, then Brodie’s deterrence strategy did indeed give rise to a new strategic culture, because even after the battlefields of the 1950s and 1960s proved that Brodie was wrong, the defense intellectuals continued to pretend otherwise and to work on various aspects of strategy, which still assumed that non-nuclear war is no longer possible, or at least, is of little consequence (Bacevich, 2005).    

References

Bacevich, A. J. (2005). The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katzenstein, P., (ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 1-78). New York: Columbia University Press.

Kier, E. (1996). “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II.” In: P. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 186-215). New York: Columbia University Press.

Snyder, J. L. (1977). The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Available at http://bit.ly/1hKoWGH.

Does the military have a right to be different from, or a need to be reflective of, the society which it serves?

According to Max Weber, the armed forces can be most effective only when the rational, functional discipline of the military (which would stem from its organizational objectives) overrides the military professional’s identification with and loyalties to the civilian society. Consequently, Weber thought that this military discipline should erase the civilian habits of behaviour in recruits while turning them into soldiers (Rosen, 1996). Thus, Max Weber was clearly of the view that the military not only has the right to be different from the civilian society; but it actually should be different from the civilian society, and can only get harmed by attempting to reflect it in any way. However, perhaps Weber’s, just described, statements on the matter, were too broad, and would prove to be inappropriate, or at least, too simplistic, when one starts to analyse specific aspects of the military profession.

Thus, according to Ficarrotta (1997), if the armed forces are to effectively perform their function, military professionals should both be bound by special moral obligations not binding on civilians, and strictly follow all those moral obligations that apply to civilians. Hence, based on this line of thought, at least when it comes to its morals, the military clearly has the right to be different from the civilian part of society, even though civilian morals should form an important part of the military moral code.

However, according to Ficarrotta (1997), there are reasons to believe that the effectiveness of the armed forces will not suffer if military professionals who follow all moral obligations, required of a military professional, on duty, do not follow some or all of these moral obligations while off duty. This suggests that the military has the right to and should be morally different from the civilian society, while it is performing its functions. However, the people, who collectively form the armed forces, need not be morally different from civilians, whenever they aren’t functioning as part of the armed forces.

On the other hand, according to Ficarrotta (1997), it is possible that if military professionals always follow their professional military obligations in all contexts, the moral image of the military, in the eyes of the public, will be higher; which will contribute to a greater support for the military by the public. Also, highly moral soldiers are more likely to go above and beyond the call of duty if they believe that their military leaders are exceptionally moral. Hence, these arguments suggest that military professionals should follow the military moral code both while they are on duty and while they are off duty in their civilian roles; suggesting that all component parts of the military have the right to and should be morally different from the civilian society which they serve, in all cases.

References

Ficarrotta, J. C. (1997). “Are Military Professionals Bound by a Higher Moral Standard?” Armed Forces and Society, 24(1): 59-75.

Rosen, S. P. (1996). Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies (pp. 1-32). Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press.

Do Civil-Military Relations (CMR) constitute a partnership?

According to Feaver (2003), CMR is clearly not a partnership. Instead it is a hierarchical relationship, involving strategic interaction, in which civilians hire the military to protect their society from enemies. Hence, according to Feaver (2003), CMR is just one variety of a common employer-employee relationship, which is called the principal-agent framework by the economists. This type of a relationship carries a number of challenging problems for the participants, and, as a result, is characterized by strategic interaction. For example, the employer wants to hire a diligent worker. However, every not-so-diligent worker wants to get hired, and hence will go to great lengths to present himself as being very diligent, during the selection process. Also, every employer wants to get the most amount of work for the least amount of pay, out of his/her employee; while every employee wants to be paid the largest amount of money for doing the least amount of work. Hence, the interests of the civilian employer and the military employee are in direct opposition. This leads to both sides constantly attempting to fool one another; while simultaneously demanding more from each other, and attempting to force each other to keep all promises (Feaver, 2003).      

On the other hand, Bland (1999) apparently believes that CMR is a partnership. In fact, according to him, civilian leaders and military officers share responsibility for the civilian control of the military. Specifically, both groups of leaders are responsible and accountable for their respective aspects of civilian control over the military. Bland (1999) supports this idea by asserting that empirical evidence on CMR demonstrates that military experts, not only direct military operations and provide technical advice to civilian leaders; but they also assist civilian leaders in controlling the armed forces. Moreover, even in mature liberal democracies, military leaders are expected to engage in joint decision-making with civilian leaders, regarding national defense and the use of armed forces (Bland, 1999).

At least when it comes to the CMR in the modern United States, I am inclined to side with Bland (1999), rather than Feaver (2003), because I agree with Mills (1956). Mills sees three dominant sources of power over the modern US: the political order, the military order, and the economy (dominated by several hundred huge, interrelated corporations). And according to him, the decisions taken by the US military, both rest upon and have a serious effect on the political life of the US and its economy. Moreover, Mills (1956) argues that American generals and admirals hold positions of decisive political and economic relevance, and have many interests in common with the political leaders of the visible government and the corporate rich. All of this suggests that CMR is an egalitarian, collaborative relationship between the military and the two types of civilian leaders.

References

Bland, D. L. (1999). “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces and Society, 26(1): 7-26.

Feaver, P. (2003). Armed Servants (pp. 54-117). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mills, C. W. (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Are the two imperatives of the armed forces actually all that different?

The two imperatives of the armed forces do appear to be very different. For a start, their sources are completely different. While the functional imperative stems from the threats to the society’s security; it is the various ideologies, social forces, and the institutions dominant within the society, that determine the societal imperative (Huntington, 1957). Moreover, if the two imperatives were similar, it would seem reasonable to expect there to be societies whose military institutions have been shaped by only one of these imperatives. However, there is no evidence of such societies; and there are good reasons for that. In fact, military institutions, which are shaped only by social values, are unlikely to be capable of effectively dealing with threats to the society’s security. Similarly, military institutions that have been shaped only by functional imperatives are unlikely to remain stable within, and cooperate with, any civilian society (Huntington, 1957). 

It is interesting to note that the armed forces have persistently intervened in the politics of many different countries of the past and present. And their interventions were usually decisive and led to the establishment of military rule in those countries (Finer, 1962). These phenomena may indicate multiple instances of armed forces shaped primarily by the functional imperative; whether because the political intervention was carried out because the civilian authorities were seen as being incapable of securing the society, or because the various ideologies, social forces, and the institutions dominant within the society were deemed inappropriate by the military, which desired to change them in accordance with its vision.

But why should the armed forces be at risk of having social values that are different from the larger society? Don’t all members of the military get inculcated with civilian social values long before they join the military? First, unlike many forms of civilian organization, the military is a purposive instrument, rationally conceived and aimed at fulfilling certain objectives – in particular, fighting and winning wars (Finer, 1962). Second, to help fulfill this purpose, every military has five main features: (1) It has a centralized command. (2) It is hierarchically organized. (3) All of its members are subject to discipline. (4) It is connected by its own communication network. (5) It has its own, unique, epirit de corps, with its corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency of the military. These five features make the armed forces much more highly organized, and hence distinct, from any civilian organizations; while its fifth feature - epirit de corps – imparts and sustains in military professionals uniquely military social values, which may even lead to contempt for civilians (Finer, 1962).

References

Finer, S. E. (1962). The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (pp. 1-22). London: Pinter.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). “Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military Relations.” In: S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp. 1-4). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

How has the political evolution of the state influenced the role of the armed forces?

Political evolution of human societies gradually led to the emergence of states. The first states were necessarily agrarian, and according to Mann (1993), agrarian states used at least ¾ of their revenue to fund wars. So, as a result, their military personnel greatly outnumbered their civilian officials and made state-societies look like war-making machines.

Mann’s (1986) analysis of power suggests that the emergence of what he classifies as authoritative, intensive form of power (i.e. concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized) in the armed forces (where such form of power was clearly very useful) likely led to its widespread adoption by the states; in no small measure because the armies which were ruled by this form of power proved to be superior to others, and thus strengthened their parent states. Thus, it can be argued, based on Mann’s (1986) analysis, that the evolution of armed forces influenced the political role and functions of the state, not just the other way around. In addition, according to Mann (1993), many radical changes in the political structure and role of the state (i.e. revolutions) would not have taken place without the assistance of military factions, whose vision of their role in society, it can be argued, has, at that time, changed toward a more radical position.

According to Mann (1993), the emergence of modern states led to the formal monopolization of military violence by these states. But instead of ending the autonomy of military power, this change led to the redirection of military power through state’s formal organizations.  Thus, rapid political evolution of European states during early modern period led, by the 18^th century, to the centralization of the military under a high command, which in turn, fell under the formal control of the state’s chief executive. Also, the start of the Second Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 19^th century turned militaries into customers of industrial capitalism (Mann, 1993). At the same time, these developments can be linked to Mann’s (1993) observation of those militaries developing technocratic self-confidence, and to their skills becoming removed from everyday controls and social practices. All of this, in turn, may have led to what Mann (1993) describes as militaries becoming insulated, caste-like, within the state, developing segmental discipline over their mass armies, and starting to recruit their lower ranks from lower social classes (Mann, 1993).

It can be argued, based on Mann’s (1993) analysis, that the political evolution of the state gradually led to the near autonomy in actual function (despite formal integration) of various branches of the modern state. Given this, it should not be surprising that during the later years of the Cold War, the military could act autonomously and terminate the state and even the world, as Mann (1993) argues it could.

References

Mann, M. (1986). “Societies as organized power networks.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume I: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760 (pp.1-33). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1kwZELI.

Mann, M. (1993). “A theory of the modern state.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume II: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914 (pp. 44-91). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1mbDKh7.  

How do theories of civil-military relations help us understand actual civil-military relations?

As Jorgensen’s (2010) discussion suggests, a theory of civil-military relations can function as a helpful guide for conducting research on actual civil-military relations. It can function as a device for interpreting data on actual civil-military relations, helping us understand the symbolic dimensions of this data, and put it into perspective. Also, Jorgensen argues that theories of civil-military relations can lead us to question our personal views on actual civil-military relations, and force us to see that there are different ways of seeing the same actual civil-military relations. In addition, a theory of civil-military relations helps us to determine which data on actual civil-military relations is important for our purposes and which data is not, thus functioning as a simplifying device. Also, according to Jorgensen, a theory of civil-military relations helps us identify existing aspects of the actual civil-military relations, suggests how we can know about them, as well as telling us what we should ‘make of them.’ 

Cox (1981) divides all theories into ‘problem-solving theories’ and ‘critical theories.’ A problem-solving theory starts with the assumption of permanence of the institutions and social and power relations that exist in the world, and then proceeds to analyze any phenomena of interest which are known to be constantly changing. Hence, a problem-solving theory of civil-military relations would reduce the statement, about a particular aspect of actual civil-military relations, to a limited number of variables which can be analyzed fairly closely and precisely; and hence, would allow us to deduce laws or regularities about the workings of actual civil-military relations.

On the other hand, according to Cox’s dichotomy, a critical theory of civil-military relations, would not take the institutions and social and power relations, inherent in actual civil-military relations, for granted, and would instead concern itself with their origins, as well as ways in which they may be changing and how they may be changing. Moreover, a critical theory of civil-military relations would construct a larger picture of the whole, of which the particular aspect of actual civil-military relations analyzed by the problem-solving theory is just one component.

   

References

Cox, R. W. (1981). “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium, 10(2):126-155.  Available at http://bit.ly/1t8NEnG.

Jorgensen, K. E. (2010). “Why Theorize International Relations?” In: K. E. Jorgensen, International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (pp. 6-32). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 

Why do we demand critical infrastructure security?

We demand the security of critical infrastructure because “disrupting its function would lead to a significant socio-economic crisis with the potential to undermine the stability of a society and thereby cause political, strategic, and security consequences.” More specifically, critical infrastructure is protected because (1) it may carry a symbolic importance; (2) there is an immediate dependence on it; and (3) it is subject to complex dependencies (Tabansky, 2011).

When it comes to the symbolic importance of the critical infrastructure, “several democratic countries include heritage sites, museums, archives, and monuments among critical infrastructures that should be protected” (Tabansky, 2011). The symbolic importance of the infrastructure may also come from the real or perceived power it provides to the government. “For example, a hostile disruption of traditional media used by the state for communicating with its citizens will immediately harm the government’s ability to function. Moreover, in the longer term, such disruption may diminish the citizens’ confidence in the existing government, or even the general form of government or regime” (Tabansky, 2011).

A good example of a critical infrastructure on which there is an immediate dependence is “the electricity grid or telecommunications network, which is … [essential] for most processes in society.” More narrowly, “Cyberspace is a representative example of an infrastructure that has become critical because of the interface of most of society’s activity with computerized communications networks” (Tabansky, 2011).

Critical infrastructure is also subject to complex dependencies, because “The relationships among various infrastructures are presumably not fully known, and the failure of one component is liable to cause a wide range of results and damage.” There are three types of failure stemming from complex dependencies of infrastructures: common cause failure, cascading failure, and escalating failure (Tabansky, 2011). Common cause failure could include “various facilities (fuel storage, airports, and power stations) that are located in geographic proximity are likely to be harmed from a single incident of flooding.” In the case of cascading failure “Disruption of a control system in one infrastructure (for example, water) leads to disruption of a second infrastructure (for example, in transportation, the flooding of a railway line), and then a third (for example, food supply chain) and so on.” While under escalating failure “Disruption of one infrastructure (for example, a communications network) harms the effort to fix other infrastructures that have been damaged by another entity (emergency services, commerce)” (Tabansky, 2011).

References

Tabansky, I. [2011], “Critical Infrastructure Protection against Cyber Threats”, Military and Strategic Affairs 3(2), 61-78, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1326273687.pdf

What are the security threats emanating from space ?

Since some form and quantity of security is required for consumption of all goods and services, security is a necessary complement to all goods and services. Thus, some form and quantity of space security is required for our continued consumption of goods and services on Earth (because insecurities in space can adversely affect the security on Earth), as well as for our emerging ability to “consume” the opportunities offered by space. And space is not free of security problems. Space debris can spiral to Earth and/or interfere with or damage someone’s spacecraft; while the absence of space traffic laws and regulations can result in collisions of spacecrafts, and satellites that are important for Earthly telecommunication, surveillance, etc. (UNIDIR, 2008). The absence of space governance and property rights can adversely affect our ability to exploit the resources offered by space; while weaponization of space and the potential for space-based military conflicts presents a grave danger to people and property, both in space and on Earth (UNIDIR, 2008).

Security is also an uncertain good as security-breaches are irregular and unpredictable. Consequently, risk-averse individuals tend to demand insurance against unpredictable security breaches. This insurance can take the form of some kind of preventive measures and/or after-the-fact compensation. When it comes to space security, most preventive measures to date appear to be limited to developing laws, regulations, and agreements regarding the usage of space; as UNIDIR’s (2008) conference report seems to demonstrate. While, with regards to after-the-fact compensation, most spacecraft has probably been insured since the start of space age in 1960s; if only because of its high failure rate in operations.

References

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (2008, 31 March - 1 April 2008). Security in Space: The Next Generation - Conference Report. Available at http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/security-in-space-the-next-generation-conference-report-31-march-1-april-2008-342.pdf

What are the short-run prevention measures to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia?

One proposed solution, to the piracy off the coast of Somalia, consists of a military land intervention by an international community. “… a series of small military operations could be carried out in order to identify, pacify and contain the elements of concern. … by addressing piracy groups on an individual basis” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010). However, this type of

Military intervention brings with it the likelihood of casualties, whether they are pirate or civilian … a single Somalian casualty would be fiercely avenged by the individual clans and sub clan alliances. This would essentially tip the delicately balanced system Puntland has established into a state of potential anarchy, it would provide an excuse for elements such as Al-Shabab to enter Puntland under the guise of resistance and further destabilize the area. (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010)

Hence, if it is to have any chance of success, a military intervention “has to be undertaken by the Somali Puntland authorities themselves” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

Another way to counter the piracy threat would be to further enhance the naval protection in the region. However, this may not suffice as “Pirates are [already] operating far away off the coastline from Somalia and because of growing financial capabilities via ransom and advanced technologies, the operational area of pirates has enlarged to an unknown area” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

“An often, especially from practice, suggested solution to encounter the piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden is the involvement of the private sector. … The concept provides that commercial vessels are protected by professional trained and well equipped teams. Ideally the sole presence of those teams should deter potential attackers.” But again, there is a risk that pirates will shift their attacks towards poorly protected ships, as all ships passing through the Gulf of Aden cannot be expected to hire private security (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

References

Kunertova, D. et al. (2010). “European Anti-piracy Strategy: Somalian Piracy: Today’s Challenge Addressed by an EU Initiative”, Dresden Technical University, New Dimensions of Security in Europe, http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/zentrale_einrichtungen/zis/newseceu/outcomes/papers_folder/MilSec_EU%20anti-piracy%20strategy.pdf

What are the factors generating demand for anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia?

Piracy is foremost a national security threat (regional security, illicit trade, loss of revenue from reduced ship traffic, environmental threat): it is the Somalian state that bears the greatest cost as a result of their actions. Nearly 4 million Somalis depend on food donations to survive and not every ship carrying food is able to afford having an armed escort, therefore attacks by Somali pirates could eventually lead to a greater threat of widespread starvation than the state is already experiencing. (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010)

“Somali piracy not only disrupts the trade throughout the region, but also increases the overall price of international commerce going through the Gulf to Western states” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

“Piracy off the coast of Somalia has more than doubled in 2008; so far over 60 ships have been attacked. Pirates are regularly demanding and receiving million-dollar ransom payments and are becoming more aggressive and assertive” (Middleton, 2008).

“The international community must be aware of the danger that Somali pirates could become agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransoms is helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US terror-listed Al-Shabaab” (Middleton, 2008).

To some within the [Somali] community, the pirates are amoral thugs bringing yet more trouble to their shores. … The town of Eyl [is] Somalia's modern-day pirate capital … Mohammed Khalif, one of the town's Islamic leaders, says … “They [the pirates] have troubled us a lot. They have brought us alcohol, commercial sex workers and massive inflation. Lots of killings also take place here.” … Abdirahman Mohamed Mahmoud, Puntland's regional president, took office in January on an anti-piracy platform. He says fighting the pirates is high on his agenda. … Religious leaders from all over Puntland have also embarked on a mission to battle the buccaneers. And what better place to try to reform pirates than in Eyl. At the town square they hold an assembly. Their sermons focus on the vices the pirates have introduced with the money they earn. (Adow, 2009)

References

Adow, M. (2009, June 17). “The Pirate Kings of Puntland,” Al Jazeera English. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/06/2009614125245860630.html. 

Kunertova, D. et al. (2010). “European Anti-piracy Strategy: Somalian Piracy: Today’s Challenge Addressed by an EU Initiative”, Dresden Technical University, New Dimensions of Security in Europe, http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/zentrale_einrichtungen/zis/newseceu/outcomes/papers_folder/MilSec_EU%20anti-piracy%20strategy.pdf

Middleton, R. (2008). Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Briefing Paper. Chatham House. Available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/1008piracysomalia.pdf

What are the role and importance of leadership in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)?

Leadership by a certain nation or nations clearly plays an important role in the proliferation or non-proliferation of WMDs. This happens in no small part because “National interests, balance-of power considerations, and alliance commitments always override international treaty commitments.” Thus, “While Russia helped China’s and Iran’s nuclear programs” in the past; the US, as of 2006, was “seen as lacking both the clout and the credibility to build a broad international coalition that would dissuade countries from going nuclear” (Malik, 2006). On the other hand, “China has long used nuclear and missile proliferation to pressure the United States to curb its arms sales to Taiwan and contain its Asian rivals (Japan and India) by arming North Korea and Pakistan”; who in turn started to proliferate WMD technology to ‘tertiary’ “nuclear aspirants (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Burma)” (Malik, 2006).

References

Malik, M. (2006). “WMD Proliferation: The Nexus between State, Nonstate, and Antistate Actors.” In Lloyd, R. M. (Ed.) Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century (pp. 91-102).