What value does the concept of strategic culture add to the study of Civil-Military Relations?

Snyder (1977) suggests that the knowledge of a particular strategic culture allows one to better predict the behaviour and strategic decision making, which can be expected from strategists heavily influenced by that strategic culture. More specifically, for example, pre-existing strategic notions, present within a particular culture, can heavily influence the organizational and doctrinal adaptations to new technologies, in that culture. Moreover, because strategic culture, like any other type of culture, changes overtime; the notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes, certain states willingly engaged in military interventions into other states, during some historical periods but not during others (Katzenstein, 1996). Similarly, choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines can be better explained by examining the cultural environment of the relevant policy makers (Kier, 1996). 

Also, according to Kier (1996), the notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why different military organizations differ in their views of the world and their views on how they should conduct their missions in it. After all, the unique organizational culture of every military organization strongly influences what this military organization will perceive to be in its interest.

So, how do these ideas play out in practice?

The strategic culture, of the US during the Cold War, seems to provide a good example. In effect, this strategic culture was started by one intellectual, and due to favourable political circumstances, quickly spread, and came to influence all of US strategic thinking throughout the Cold War.  Thus, in 1946, an expert on military affairs, named Bernard Brodie, concluded that the invention of nuclear weapons made war impermissible. So, he thought that the new military strategy could only consist of the prevention of war through the threat of force – an idea which came to be called the deterrence doctrine (Bacevich, 2005). This idea clearly produced a whole new strategic culture. After all, it led to the creation of a new profession, whose practitioners came to be called defense intellectuals. And it led to the creation of new, highly influential institutions, such as the RAND Corporation. Not surprisingly, the defense intellectuals working in these institutions produced a vast body of highly influential literature, largely focused on various aspects of Brodie’s deterrence strategy (Bacevich, 2005). Finally, it seems reasonable to believe that a strategic idea, which was incorrect, would be quickly discarded, unless it gave rise to a whole strategic culture. If so, then Brodie’s deterrence strategy did indeed give rise to a new strategic culture, because even after the battlefields of the 1950s and 1960s proved that Brodie was wrong, the defense intellectuals continued to pretend otherwise and to work on various aspects of strategy, which still assumed that non-nuclear war is no longer possible, or at least, is of little consequence (Bacevich, 2005).    

References

Bacevich, A. J. (2005). The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katzenstein, P., (ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 1-78). New York: Columbia University Press.

Kier, E. (1996). “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II.” In: P. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 186-215). New York: Columbia University Press.

Snyder, J. L. (1977). The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Available at http://bit.ly/1hKoWGH.