How has the political evolution of the state influenced the role of the armed forces?

Political evolution of human societies gradually led to the emergence of states. The first states were necessarily agrarian, and according to Mann (1993), agrarian states used at least ¾ of their revenue to fund wars. So, as a result, their military personnel greatly outnumbered their civilian officials and made state-societies look like war-making machines.

Mann’s (1986) analysis of power suggests that the emergence of what he classifies as authoritative, intensive form of power (i.e. concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized) in the armed forces (where such form of power was clearly very useful) likely led to its widespread adoption by the states; in no small measure because the armies which were ruled by this form of power proved to be superior to others, and thus strengthened their parent states. Thus, it can be argued, based on Mann’s (1986) analysis, that the evolution of armed forces influenced the political role and functions of the state, not just the other way around. In addition, according to Mann (1993), many radical changes in the political structure and role of the state (i.e. revolutions) would not have taken place without the assistance of military factions, whose vision of their role in society, it can be argued, has, at that time, changed toward a more radical position.

According to Mann (1993), the emergence of modern states led to the formal monopolization of military violence by these states. But instead of ending the autonomy of military power, this change led to the redirection of military power through state’s formal organizations.  Thus, rapid political evolution of European states during early modern period led, by the 18^th century, to the centralization of the military under a high command, which in turn, fell under the formal control of the state’s chief executive. Also, the start of the Second Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 19^th century turned militaries into customers of industrial capitalism (Mann, 1993). At the same time, these developments can be linked to Mann’s (1993) observation of those militaries developing technocratic self-confidence, and to their skills becoming removed from everyday controls and social practices. All of this, in turn, may have led to what Mann (1993) describes as militaries becoming insulated, caste-like, within the state, developing segmental discipline over their mass armies, and starting to recruit their lower ranks from lower social classes (Mann, 1993).

It can be argued, based on Mann’s (1993) analysis, that the political evolution of the state gradually led to the near autonomy in actual function (despite formal integration) of various branches of the modern state. Given this, it should not be surprising that during the later years of the Cold War, the military could act autonomously and terminate the state and even the world, as Mann (1993) argues it could.

References

Mann, M. (1986). “Societies as organized power networks.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume I: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760 (pp.1-33). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1kwZELI.

Mann, M. (1993). “A theory of the modern state.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume II: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914 (pp. 44-91). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1mbDKh7.  

How do theories of civil-military relations help us understand actual civil-military relations?

As Jorgensen’s (2010) discussion suggests, a theory of civil-military relations can function as a helpful guide for conducting research on actual civil-military relations. It can function as a device for interpreting data on actual civil-military relations, helping us understand the symbolic dimensions of this data, and put it into perspective. Also, Jorgensen argues that theories of civil-military relations can lead us to question our personal views on actual civil-military relations, and force us to see that there are different ways of seeing the same actual civil-military relations. In addition, a theory of civil-military relations helps us to determine which data on actual civil-military relations is important for our purposes and which data is not, thus functioning as a simplifying device. Also, according to Jorgensen, a theory of civil-military relations helps us identify existing aspects of the actual civil-military relations, suggests how we can know about them, as well as telling us what we should ‘make of them.’ 

Cox (1981) divides all theories into ‘problem-solving theories’ and ‘critical theories.’ A problem-solving theory starts with the assumption of permanence of the institutions and social and power relations that exist in the world, and then proceeds to analyze any phenomena of interest which are known to be constantly changing. Hence, a problem-solving theory of civil-military relations would reduce the statement, about a particular aspect of actual civil-military relations, to a limited number of variables which can be analyzed fairly closely and precisely; and hence, would allow us to deduce laws or regularities about the workings of actual civil-military relations.

On the other hand, according to Cox’s dichotomy, a critical theory of civil-military relations, would not take the institutions and social and power relations, inherent in actual civil-military relations, for granted, and would instead concern itself with their origins, as well as ways in which they may be changing and how they may be changing. Moreover, a critical theory of civil-military relations would construct a larger picture of the whole, of which the particular aspect of actual civil-military relations analyzed by the problem-solving theory is just one component.

   

References

Cox, R. W. (1981). “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium, 10(2):126-155.  Available at http://bit.ly/1t8NEnG.

Jorgensen, K. E. (2010). “Why Theorize International Relations?” In: K. E. Jorgensen, International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (pp. 6-32). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 

Why do we demand critical infrastructure security?

We demand the security of critical infrastructure because “disrupting its function would lead to a significant socio-economic crisis with the potential to undermine the stability of a society and thereby cause political, strategic, and security consequences.” More specifically, critical infrastructure is protected because (1) it may carry a symbolic importance; (2) there is an immediate dependence on it; and (3) it is subject to complex dependencies (Tabansky, 2011).

When it comes to the symbolic importance of the critical infrastructure, “several democratic countries include heritage sites, museums, archives, and monuments among critical infrastructures that should be protected” (Tabansky, 2011). The symbolic importance of the infrastructure may also come from the real or perceived power it provides to the government. “For example, a hostile disruption of traditional media used by the state for communicating with its citizens will immediately harm the government’s ability to function. Moreover, in the longer term, such disruption may diminish the citizens’ confidence in the existing government, or even the general form of government or regime” (Tabansky, 2011).

A good example of a critical infrastructure on which there is an immediate dependence is “the electricity grid or telecommunications network, which is … [essential] for most processes in society.” More narrowly, “Cyberspace is a representative example of an infrastructure that has become critical because of the interface of most of society’s activity with computerized communications networks” (Tabansky, 2011).

Critical infrastructure is also subject to complex dependencies, because “The relationships among various infrastructures are presumably not fully known, and the failure of one component is liable to cause a wide range of results and damage.” There are three types of failure stemming from complex dependencies of infrastructures: common cause failure, cascading failure, and escalating failure (Tabansky, 2011). Common cause failure could include “various facilities (fuel storage, airports, and power stations) that are located in geographic proximity are likely to be harmed from a single incident of flooding.” In the case of cascading failure “Disruption of a control system in one infrastructure (for example, water) leads to disruption of a second infrastructure (for example, in transportation, the flooding of a railway line), and then a third (for example, food supply chain) and so on.” While under escalating failure “Disruption of one infrastructure (for example, a communications network) harms the effort to fix other infrastructures that have been damaged by another entity (emergency services, commerce)” (Tabansky, 2011).

References

Tabansky, I. [2011], “Critical Infrastructure Protection against Cyber Threats”, Military and Strategic Affairs 3(2), 61-78, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1326273687.pdf

What are the security threats emanating from space ?

Since some form and quantity of security is required for consumption of all goods and services, security is a necessary complement to all goods and services. Thus, some form and quantity of space security is required for our continued consumption of goods and services on Earth (because insecurities in space can adversely affect the security on Earth), as well as for our emerging ability to “consume” the opportunities offered by space. And space is not free of security problems. Space debris can spiral to Earth and/or interfere with or damage someone’s spacecraft; while the absence of space traffic laws and regulations can result in collisions of spacecrafts, and satellites that are important for Earthly telecommunication, surveillance, etc. (UNIDIR, 2008). The absence of space governance and property rights can adversely affect our ability to exploit the resources offered by space; while weaponization of space and the potential for space-based military conflicts presents a grave danger to people and property, both in space and on Earth (UNIDIR, 2008).

Security is also an uncertain good as security-breaches are irregular and unpredictable. Consequently, risk-averse individuals tend to demand insurance against unpredictable security breaches. This insurance can take the form of some kind of preventive measures and/or after-the-fact compensation. When it comes to space security, most preventive measures to date appear to be limited to developing laws, regulations, and agreements regarding the usage of space; as UNIDIR’s (2008) conference report seems to demonstrate. While, with regards to after-the-fact compensation, most spacecraft has probably been insured since the start of space age in 1960s; if only because of its high failure rate in operations.

References

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (2008, 31 March - 1 April 2008). Security in Space: The Next Generation - Conference Report. Available at http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/security-in-space-the-next-generation-conference-report-31-march-1-april-2008-342.pdf

What are the short-run prevention measures to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia?

One proposed solution, to the piracy off the coast of Somalia, consists of a military land intervention by an international community. “… a series of small military operations could be carried out in order to identify, pacify and contain the elements of concern. … by addressing piracy groups on an individual basis” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010). However, this type of

Military intervention brings with it the likelihood of casualties, whether they are pirate or civilian … a single Somalian casualty would be fiercely avenged by the individual clans and sub clan alliances. This would essentially tip the delicately balanced system Puntland has established into a state of potential anarchy, it would provide an excuse for elements such as Al-Shabab to enter Puntland under the guise of resistance and further destabilize the area. (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010)

Hence, if it is to have any chance of success, a military intervention “has to be undertaken by the Somali Puntland authorities themselves” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

Another way to counter the piracy threat would be to further enhance the naval protection in the region. However, this may not suffice as “Pirates are [already] operating far away off the coastline from Somalia and because of growing financial capabilities via ransom and advanced technologies, the operational area of pirates has enlarged to an unknown area” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

“An often, especially from practice, suggested solution to encounter the piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden is the involvement of the private sector. … The concept provides that commercial vessels are protected by professional trained and well equipped teams. Ideally the sole presence of those teams should deter potential attackers.” But again, there is a risk that pirates will shift their attacks towards poorly protected ships, as all ships passing through the Gulf of Aden cannot be expected to hire private security (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

References

Kunertova, D. et al. (2010). “European Anti-piracy Strategy: Somalian Piracy: Today’s Challenge Addressed by an EU Initiative”, Dresden Technical University, New Dimensions of Security in Europe, http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/zentrale_einrichtungen/zis/newseceu/outcomes/papers_folder/MilSec_EU%20anti-piracy%20strategy.pdf

What are the factors generating demand for anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia?

Piracy is foremost a national security threat (regional security, illicit trade, loss of revenue from reduced ship traffic, environmental threat): it is the Somalian state that bears the greatest cost as a result of their actions. Nearly 4 million Somalis depend on food donations to survive and not every ship carrying food is able to afford having an armed escort, therefore attacks by Somali pirates could eventually lead to a greater threat of widespread starvation than the state is already experiencing. (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010)

“Somali piracy not only disrupts the trade throughout the region, but also increases the overall price of international commerce going through the Gulf to Western states” (Kunertova, D. et al., 2010).

“Piracy off the coast of Somalia has more than doubled in 2008; so far over 60 ships have been attacked. Pirates are regularly demanding and receiving million-dollar ransom payments and are becoming more aggressive and assertive” (Middleton, 2008).

“The international community must be aware of the danger that Somali pirates could become agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransoms is helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US terror-listed Al-Shabaab” (Middleton, 2008).

To some within the [Somali] community, the pirates are amoral thugs bringing yet more trouble to their shores. … The town of Eyl [is] Somalia's modern-day pirate capital … Mohammed Khalif, one of the town's Islamic leaders, says … “They [the pirates] have troubled us a lot. They have brought us alcohol, commercial sex workers and massive inflation. Lots of killings also take place here.” … Abdirahman Mohamed Mahmoud, Puntland's regional president, took office in January on an anti-piracy platform. He says fighting the pirates is high on his agenda. … Religious leaders from all over Puntland have also embarked on a mission to battle the buccaneers. And what better place to try to reform pirates than in Eyl. At the town square they hold an assembly. Their sermons focus on the vices the pirates have introduced with the money they earn. (Adow, 2009)

References

Adow, M. (2009, June 17). “The Pirate Kings of Puntland,” Al Jazeera English. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/06/2009614125245860630.html. 

Kunertova, D. et al. (2010). “European Anti-piracy Strategy: Somalian Piracy: Today’s Challenge Addressed by an EU Initiative”, Dresden Technical University, New Dimensions of Security in Europe, http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/zentrale_einrichtungen/zis/newseceu/outcomes/papers_folder/MilSec_EU%20anti-piracy%20strategy.pdf

Middleton, R. (2008). Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Briefing Paper. Chatham House. Available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/1008piracysomalia.pdf

What are the role and importance of leadership in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)?

Leadership by a certain nation or nations clearly plays an important role in the proliferation or non-proliferation of WMDs. This happens in no small part because “National interests, balance-of power considerations, and alliance commitments always override international treaty commitments.” Thus, “While Russia helped China’s and Iran’s nuclear programs” in the past; the US, as of 2006, was “seen as lacking both the clout and the credibility to build a broad international coalition that would dissuade countries from going nuclear” (Malik, 2006). On the other hand, “China has long used nuclear and missile proliferation to pressure the United States to curb its arms sales to Taiwan and contain its Asian rivals (Japan and India) by arming North Korea and Pakistan”; who in turn started to proliferate WMD technology to ‘tertiary’ “nuclear aspirants (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Burma)” (Malik, 2006).

References

Malik, M. (2006). “WMD Proliferation: The Nexus between State, Nonstate, and Antistate Actors.” In Lloyd, R. M. (Ed.) Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century (pp. 91-102).