What is the function/purpose of intelligence agencies?

… By virtue of their control over secret information, intelligence agencies are ideally suited to provide comprehensive strategic analyses for policymakers. “The intelligence community,” writes Richard Betts, “is the logical set of institutions to provide what one may call the library function for national security: it keeps track of all sources, secret or not, and mobilizes them in coherent form whenever nonexpert policymakers call for them.” (Rovner, 2011, p. 4)

… How should we measure progress in the war on terrorism? How do we know if we are winning or losing? How do we wage counterinsurgency campaigns against elusive and amorphous enemies? How do we understand the increasingly complex relationships between nation-states, armed groups, and transnational actors? What are the long-term goals of resurgent great powers like Russia and China? How close are states like Iran to acquiring nuclear weapons? What do they intend to do with them? (Rovner, 2011, p. vii)

                Intelligence agencies exist to grapple with questions like these. They collect a staggering amount of information, synthesize reports from secret and open sources, and try to distill it into digestible analytical products for policymakers, diplomats, and military officers. When all goes well, intelligence estimates play an important role in strategic judgement, adding unique kinds of information and insight to help leaders cope with the inherent uncertainty and complexity of international politics. (Rovner, 2011, p. vii)

References

Rovner, J. (2011). Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Why does demand for intelligence exist?

In the ideal, intelligence contributes to rational state action by providing unique kinds of information to policy makers and by helping organize an enormous amount of data from secret and open sources. … Policymakers need intelligence to provide information, mitigate ambiguity, and reduce the amount of uncertainty in the decision making process. Wartime leaders have a special interest in knowing the disposition of enemy forces, but peacetime statesmen also benefit from intelligence when it identifies looming dangers as well as opportunities for diplomacy. (Rovner, 2011, p. 4)

References

Rovner, J. (2011). Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

What factors led to Canada’s continued involvement in the US-led military operations in Afghanistan?

“Canada had a real and vital interest in destroying the haven and base that Afghanistan had become from which international terrorists could continue to attack the West, including Canada itself” (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2008). However, Canada continued its military commitment in Afghanistan after the Taliban were removed from power, and various transnational terrorist groups lost their Afghan training camps. This happened in part because the Canadian government was eager to please Americans by demonstrating that Canada is still a good military ally, despite its refusal to participate in US led invasion of Iraq (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2008). CF’s continued action in Afghanistan also took place for other important reasons.

Recent Canadian governments and many Canadians have continued to see terrorism that arises from radical Islam as a threat to Canada and believe that Canada has a significant national interest in stopping it from retaking Afghanistan. ... ‘An increasingly interdependent world has tightened the links between international and domestic security and developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways. Today’s front lines stretch from the streets of Kabul to the rail lines of Madrid to our own Canadian cities.’ (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2008)

Canada’s war in Afghanistan is also closely linked to what is being called the ‘transformation’ of the Canadian military, the personally initiated project of the energetic Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier … He has had unprecedented leeway and influence as chief and indeed has seized the moment by using the war in Afghanistan and the government’s commitment there as the occasion to press for major changes and acquisitions which in normal circumstances would have been both delayed and/or scaled back by the political leadership. Hillier’s ‘transformation agenda’ for the Canadian armed forces has included more personnel and equipment, improved infrastructure and changes to training and the command structure. (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2008)

Thus, CF’s continued involvement in Afghanistan can, in part, be blamed on Hillier, who easily succumbed to the typical trappings of a high ranking bureaucratic position, and successfully managed to increase the size of his bureau, its budget, and all the benefits that come with it.

References

Jockel, J. and Sokolsky, J. (2008). Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Out Steps Forward. Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 6(1):100-115.

Can insurance prove to be a deterrent against terrorism?

Overall, insurance makes terrorist attacks less damaging because if all the property and lives lost from an attack are insured, the victims will suffer no overall economic losses. Also, insurance frequently results in higher investment in security, thus hardening terrorist targets. This phenomenon is apparently widespread as it has been observed in many industries “Like in fire prevention, aviation, boiler and elevator safety where insurance generated safety improvements” (Kesan et al, 2004). Cyberinsurance is an example which is clearly illustrative of this effect of insurance on many other industries.

New insurance products may make the Internet a safer business environment because cyberinsurers can require businesses to undertake loss self-protection activities, as well as tying premiums to claims histories. … cyberinsurers can proactively tie premiums to the insured firm’s investment in security processes and create market-based incentives for e-business to increase their level of IT safety. (Kesan et al, 2004)

“In addition, the insurance companies have an incentive to monitor hackers in order to minimize the amount of damage they would have to pay out to its insured firms” (Kesan et al, 2004). Thus, insurance companies that sell insurance against terrorism, can be expected to engage in the gathering of counterterrorist intelligence; greatly aiding the state security apparatus.

References

Kesan, J.P. et al. [2004], “The economic case for cyber-insurance”, University of Illinois College of Law, Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 2, http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art2

What is the best way to approach interagency coordination, when the goal is to counter national security threats?

Effective response to national security threats calls for interagency coordination of all relevant security agencies. In particular “in the context of the military and the national security community, interagency coordination can be seen as the interaction and organizational synthesis that occur between elements of DND, other government departments and agencies, and regional and international organizations to achieve a common national security objective” (Lannan, 2004). Moreover, “To be of real benefit, the interagency coordination process must be formalized down to the operational level, and must be practiced in peacetime as well as throughout all phases of conflict” (Lannan, 2004).

In Canada, in order to facilitate interagency coordination between various security agencies, a national response center, called Government Operations Centre (GOC), has been established and granted directive powers over all relevant national security agencies. “The Government Operations Centre is designed to be the central node for communications and support so as to provide a multi-faceted source of intelligence and knowledge transfer” (Lannan, 2004). It is important to note, however, that the agencies coordinated by GOC will vary depending on their relevance to a particular incident or threat, so as to satisfy the particular operational requirements. Thus, “it is only the process of coordination that needs to be institutionalized. The asymmetrical threat that confronts us is simply too unpredictable to establish a fixed structural organization” (Lannan, 2004).

According to David Tucker (as quoted in Lannan (2004)), an effective interagency coordination process involves three elements: “It is a network disguised as a hierarchy; it incorporates different decision modes and speeds; and it has horizontal and vertical dimensions.”

Within a hierarchy, decisions can be made rapidly because of its centralized authority, whereas in a network the decision-making model can be complex and slow. The interagency coordination network is adaptable, and its flexible form makes it resilient in the asymmetric threat environment, whereas a hierarchy may be less accommodating and susceptible to partisanship. (Lannan, 2004)

References

Lannan, T. [2004], “Interagency coordination within the national security community: Improving the response to terrorism”, Canadian Military Journal Autumn, 49-56.

What are the pros and cons of information-sharing, within and between intelligence agencies?

 Information sharing threatens operational security and slows down decision making. The sharing of information regarding a planned operation, can lead to it getting into the wrong hands, and undermining the whole operation. Moreover, when different participants in the operation are informed of the whole operational plan, rather than only their particular portion of the overall plan, indecisiveness, due to unnecessary reflection on the overall structure of the operation by each participant, may result (Lannan, 2004). On the other hand, failure to share information about the overall operational plan, between all participants in the operation, may lead to an inability by all participants to coordinate their actions and successfully execute the operation. This is especially likely to happen if the circumstances under which the operation is to be executed turn out to be different from those expected (Lannan, 2004). Also, if “some security environment agencies are unsure of their counterparts’ roles, responsibilities and capabilities … [an] unnecessary duplication of effort” may result (Lannan, 2004).

References

Lannan, T. [2004], “Interagency coordination within the national security community: Improving the response to terrorism”, Canadian Military Journal Autumn, 49-56.

What security measures are required to counter the potential availability of weapons of mass destruction to transnational terrorists?

Effective security measures aimed at preventing the acquisition, manufacturing or usage of the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by terrorist groups, should include the protection of key materials, required to fabricate a WMD, from being acquired by terrorists (particularly important, in this respect, is the prevention of nuclear smuggling); increasing cooperation between regional and national police forces and intelligence agencies; and improving the effectiveness of the counterterrorism intelligence agencies by eliminating rivalries between them (especially between those within the same country) while mandating them to share information and cooperate with each other (Barnaby, 2004). 

References

Barnaby, F. (2004). How to build a nuclear bomb: and other weapons of mass destruction. New York: Nation Books.