Politics and Economics of Defense, National Security, and Bureaucracy
Sunday, August 9, 2015
Saturday, July 11, 2015
To what extent do existing theories of civil-military relations apply in states with particular historical, ideological, social, and cultural contexts?
Western theories of civil-military relations seem to
apply quite well to Malawi during its first decade of independence. However, quite
likely, this is a result of heavy British influence prior to independence, as
well as the fact that the military of the newly independent Malawi was not much
different from the colonial military. In fact, all senior officers of the ‘new’
army were still of white, British ancestry (Mandiza, 2002). Either way, the
military of the newly independent Malawi remained politically neutral, even in
the face of political turmoil (Mandiza, 2002), since it apparently desired to
continue to follow British traditions and be under objective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). However, the first president
of the newly independent Malawi, surnamed Banda, had trouble dealing with his
political opponents, and desired political support from some kind of a paramilitary
organization that would be able to use violence or threat of violence in support
of his political goals (Mandiza, 2002). So, he created the Malawi Young
Pioneers (MYP). The MYP was a heavily
politicized organization, with strong paramilitary functions. It was
subordinate to the president alone. “Its main purpose was to ensure that
everyone conformed to party policy” (Mandiza, 2002). Thus, the MYP can be said
to have been a type of a national military organization, shaped almost
exclusively by a societal imperative,
and subject to purely subjective civilian
control (Huntington, 1957). Consequently, the MYP had a lot in common with
Hitler’s SS. After all, the SS was also a heavily politicized, paramilitary
organization, aimed at enforcing the will of the Nazi party (Wegner, 1990).
And just like the MYP, the SS was also given official status and expanded, out
of dissatisfaction with the political position of the official state military, which
initially did not wish to participate in politics, and later became opposed to
adventurous, aggressive foreign policies pursued by the Nazi government
(Huntington, 1957).
The early, post-colonial situation in the neighbouring
Mozambique also poses no problems for Western theories of civil-military
relations. The military of post-colonial Mozambique was exactly the same
organization that earlier constituted the armed wing of the liberation movement
(i.e. the war of independence that led to the end of colonial rule). Similar to
Malawi, the early, post-colonial government of Mozambique desired political
support from an organization capable of using violence or threats of violence
on its behalf (Macaringue, 2002). However, Mozambique’s post-colonial military,
despite having strong political commitments during the war of independence,
apparently had little interest in political involvement. Consequently, the
government decided to forcibly shape the military by a societal imperative, and
bring it under subjective civilian control. This was done by a “combination of
penetration by the party, political education and the provision of substantial
resources” (Macaringue, 2002). Not surprisingly, the Nazi government used very
similar tactics (in addition to others) to convert the uncooperative German
military to the Nazi point of view and make them more obedient in executing
Nazi policies (Huntington, 1957).
References
Huntington, S. P. (1957). The Soldier
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp. 1-4, 80-97, 98-141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macaringue, P. (2002). “Civil-military relations in post-Cold War
Mozambique.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams
(eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military
Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 137-151).
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Macaringue.pdf.
Mandiza, E. I.
(2002). “Civil-military relations in Malawi: An historical perspective.” In: R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams (eds.), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations
and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (pp. 107-134). Pretoria: Institute
for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Mandiza.pdf.
Wegner, B. (1990). The
Waffen-SS: Organization, ideology, and function. Oxford:
Blackwell.
What value does the concept of strategic culture add to the study of Civil-Military Relations?
Snyder (1977) suggests that the knowledge of a
particular strategic culture allows one to better predict the behaviour and
strategic decision making, which can be expected from strategists heavily
influenced by that strategic culture. More specifically, for example,
pre-existing strategic notions, present within a particular culture, can
heavily influence the organizational and doctrinal adaptations to new
technologies, in that culture. Moreover, because strategic culture, like any
other type of culture, changes overtime; the notion of strategic culture allows
us to better understand why in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes,
certain states willingly engaged in military interventions into other states,
during some historical periods but not during others (Katzenstein, 1996). Similarly, choices between offensive and defensive
military doctrines can be better explained by examining the cultural
environment of the relevant policy makers (Kier, 1996).
Also, according to Kier (1996), the
notion of strategic culture allows us to better understand why different military organizations differ in their views
of the world and their views on how they should conduct their missions in it. After
all, the unique organizational culture of every military organization strongly
influences what this military organization will perceive to be in its interest.
So, how do these ideas play out in
practice?
The strategic culture, of the US
during the Cold War, seems to provide a good example. In effect, this strategic
culture was started by one intellectual, and due to favourable political
circumstances, quickly spread, and came to influence all of US strategic
thinking throughout the Cold War. Thus,
in 1946, an expert on military affairs, named Bernard Brodie, concluded that
the invention of nuclear weapons made war impermissible. So, he thought that
the new military strategy could only consist of the prevention of war through
the threat of force – an idea which came to be called the deterrence doctrine (Bacevich, 2005). This idea clearly produced a whole new strategic culture.
After all, it led to the creation of a new profession, whose practitioners came
to be called defense intellectuals. And it led to the creation of new, highly
influential institutions, such as the RAND Corporation. Not surprisingly, the
defense intellectuals working in these institutions produced a vast body of
highly influential literature, largely focused on various aspects of Brodie’s
deterrence strategy (Bacevich, 2005).
Finally, it seems reasonable to believe that a strategic idea, which was
incorrect, would be quickly discarded, unless it gave rise to a whole strategic
culture. If so, then Brodie’s deterrence strategy did indeed give rise to a new
strategic culture, because even after the battlefields of the 1950s and 1960s
proved that Brodie was wrong, the defense intellectuals continued to pretend
otherwise and to work on various aspects of strategy, which still assumed that
non-nuclear war is no longer possible, or at least, is of little consequence (Bacevich, 2005).
References
Bacevich, A. J. (2005). The New
American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katzenstein, P., (ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp.
1-78). New York: Columbia University Press.
Kier, E.
(1996). “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II.” In: P.
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 186-215). New
York: Columbia University Press.
Snyder, J. L. (1977). The
Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Available at http://bit.ly/1hKoWGH.
Does the military have a right to be different from, or a need to be reflective of, the society which it serves?
According to Max Weber, the armed
forces can be most effective only when the rational, functional discipline of
the military (which would stem from its organizational objectives) overrides
the military professional’s identification with and loyalties to the civilian
society. Consequently, Weber thought that this military discipline should erase
the civilian habits of behaviour in recruits while turning them into soldiers
(Rosen, 1996). Thus, Max Weber was clearly of the view that the military not
only has the right to be different from the civilian society; but it actually should
be different from the civilian society, and can only get harmed by attempting
to reflect it in any way. However, perhaps Weber’s, just described, statements
on the matter, were too broad, and would prove to be inappropriate, or at
least, too simplistic, when one starts to analyse specific aspects of the
military profession.
Thus, according to Ficarrotta (1997),
if the armed forces are to effectively perform their function, military
professionals should both be bound by special moral obligations not binding on
civilians, and strictly follow all those moral obligations that apply to
civilians. Hence, based on this line of thought, at least when it comes to its
morals, the military clearly has the right to be different from the civilian
part of society, even though civilian morals should form an important part of
the military moral code.
However, according to Ficarrotta
(1997), there are reasons to believe that the effectiveness of the armed forces
will not suffer if military professionals who follow all moral obligations,
required of a military professional, on duty, do not follow some or all of
these moral obligations while off duty. This suggests that the military has the
right to and should be morally different from the civilian society, while it is
performing its functions. However, the people, who collectively form the armed
forces, need not be morally different from civilians, whenever they aren’t
functioning as part of the armed forces.
On the other hand, according to
Ficarrotta (1997), it is possible that if military professionals always follow
their professional military obligations in all contexts, the moral image of the
military, in the eyes of the public, will be higher; which will contribute to a
greater support for the military by the public. Also, highly moral soldiers are
more likely to go above and beyond the call of duty if they believe that their
military leaders are exceptionally moral. Hence, these arguments suggest that
military professionals should follow the military moral code both while they
are on duty and while they are off duty in their civilian roles; suggesting
that all component parts of the military have the right to and should be morally
different from the civilian society which they serve, in all cases.
References
Ficarrotta, J. C. (1997). “Are Military Professionals Bound by a
Higher Moral Standard?” Armed Forces and
Society, 24(1): 59-75.
Rosen, S. P. (1996). Societies
and Military Power: India and its Armies (pp. 1-32). Cornell, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Do Civil-Military Relations (CMR) constitute a partnership?
According to Feaver (2003), CMR is clearly not a
partnership. Instead it is a hierarchical relationship, involving strategic
interaction, in which civilians hire the military to protect their society from
enemies. Hence, according to Feaver (2003), CMR is just one variety of a common
employer-employee relationship, which is called the principal-agent framework
by the economists. This type of a relationship carries a number of challenging
problems for the participants, and, as a result, is characterized by strategic
interaction. For example, the employer wants to hire a diligent worker.
However, every not-so-diligent worker wants to get hired, and hence will go to
great lengths to present himself as being very diligent, during the selection
process. Also, every employer wants to get the most amount of work for the
least amount of pay, out of his/her employee; while every employee wants to be
paid the largest amount of money for doing the least amount of work. Hence, the
interests of the civilian employer and the military employee are in direct
opposition. This leads to both sides constantly attempting to fool one another;
while simultaneously demanding more from each other, and attempting to force
each other to keep all promises (Feaver, 2003).
On the other hand, Bland (1999) apparently believes
that CMR is a partnership. In fact, according to him, civilian leaders and
military officers share responsibility for the civilian control of the
military. Specifically, both groups of leaders are responsible and accountable
for their respective aspects of civilian control over the military. Bland
(1999) supports this idea by asserting that empirical evidence on CMR
demonstrates that military experts, not only direct military operations and
provide technical advice to civilian leaders; but they also assist civilian
leaders in controlling the armed forces. Moreover, even in mature liberal
democracies, military leaders are expected to engage in joint decision-making
with civilian leaders, regarding national defense and the use of armed forces
(Bland, 1999).
At least when it comes to the CMR in the modern United
States, I am inclined to side with Bland (1999), rather than Feaver (2003),
because I agree with Mills (1956). Mills sees three dominant sources of power
over the modern US: the political order, the military order, and the economy
(dominated by several hundred huge, interrelated corporations). And according
to him, the decisions taken by the US military, both rest upon and have a
serious effect on the political life of the US and its economy. Moreover, Mills
(1956) argues that American generals and admirals hold positions of decisive
political and economic relevance, and have many interests in common with the
political leaders of the visible government and the corporate rich. All of this
suggests that CMR is an egalitarian, collaborative relationship between the
military and the two types of civilian leaders.
References
Bland, D. L. (1999). “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.”
Armed Forces and Society, 26(1): 7-26.
Feaver, P. (2003). Armed
Servants (pp. 54-117). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mills, C. W. (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wednesday, July 8, 2015
Are the two imperatives of the armed forces actually all that different?
The two imperatives of the armed forces do appear to
be very different. For a start, their sources are completely different. While
the functional imperative stems from the threats to the society’s security; it
is the various ideologies, social forces, and the institutions dominant within
the society, that determine the societal imperative (Huntington, 1957).
Moreover, if the two imperatives were similar, it would seem reasonable to
expect there to be societies whose military institutions have been shaped by
only one of these imperatives. However, there is no evidence of such societies;
and there are good reasons for that. In fact, military institutions, which are
shaped only by social values, are unlikely to be capable of effectively dealing
with threats to the society’s security. Similarly, military institutions that
have been shaped only by functional imperatives are unlikely to remain stable
within, and cooperate with, any civilian society (Huntington, 1957).
It is interesting to note that the armed forces have
persistently intervened in the politics of many different countries of the past
and present. And their interventions were usually decisive and led to the
establishment of military rule in those countries (Finer, 1962). These
phenomena may indicate multiple instances of armed forces shaped primarily by
the functional imperative; whether because the political intervention was
carried out because the civilian authorities were seen as being incapable of
securing the society, or because the various ideologies, social forces, and the
institutions dominant within the society were deemed inappropriate by the military,
which desired to change them in accordance with its vision.
But why should the armed forces be at risk of having
social values that are different from the larger society? Don’t all members of
the military get inculcated with civilian social values long before they join
the military? First, unlike many forms of civilian organization, the military
is a purposive instrument, rationally conceived and aimed at fulfilling certain
objectives – in particular, fighting and winning wars (Finer, 1962). Second, to
help fulfill this purpose, every military has five main features: (1) It has a
centralized command. (2) It is hierarchically organized. (3) All of its members
are subject to discipline. (4) It is connected by its own communication
network. (5) It has its own, unique, epirit
de corps, with its corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency of the
military. These five features make the armed forces much more highly organized,
and hence distinct, from any civilian organizations; while its fifth feature - epirit de corps – imparts and sustains in
military professionals uniquely military social values, which may even lead to
contempt for civilians (Finer, 1962).
References
Finer, S. E. (1962). The Man
on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (pp. 1-22). London:
Pinter.
Huntington, S. P. (1957). “Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military
Relations.” In: S. P. Huntington, The
Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (pp.
1-4). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How has the political evolution of the state influenced the role of the armed forces?
Political evolution of human societies gradually led
to the emergence of states. The first states were necessarily agrarian, and
according to Mann (1993), agrarian states used at least ¾ of their revenue to
fund wars. So, as a result, their military personnel greatly outnumbered their
civilian officials and made state-societies look like war-making machines.
Mann’s (1986) analysis of power suggests that the
emergence of what he classifies as authoritative, intensive form of power (i.e.
concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized) in the armed forces (where such
form of power was clearly very useful) likely led to its widespread adoption by
the states; in no small measure because the armies which were ruled by this
form of power proved to be superior to others, and thus strengthened their
parent states. Thus, it can be argued, based on Mann’s (1986) analysis, that
the evolution of armed forces influenced the political role and functions of
the state, not just the other way around. In addition, according to Mann
(1993), many radical changes in the political structure and role of the state
(i.e. revolutions) would not have taken place without the assistance of
military factions, whose vision of their role in society, it can be argued, has,
at that time, changed toward a more radical position.
According to Mann (1993), the emergence of modern
states led to the formal monopolization of military violence by these states. But
instead of ending the autonomy of military power, this change led to the
redirection of military power through state’s formal organizations. Thus, rapid political evolution of European
states during early modern period led, by the 18th century, to the
centralization of the military under a high command, which in turn, fell under
the formal control of the state’s chief executive. Also, the start of the
Second Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 19th century turned
militaries into customers of industrial capitalism (Mann, 1993). At the same
time, these developments can be linked to Mann’s (1993) observation of those
militaries developing technocratic self-confidence, and to their skills
becoming removed from everyday controls and social practices. All of this, in
turn, may have led to what Mann (1993) describes as militaries becoming
insulated, caste-like, within the state, developing segmental discipline over
their mass armies, and starting to recruit their lower ranks from lower social
classes (Mann, 1993).
It can be argued, based on Mann’s (1993) analysis,
that the political evolution of the state gradually led to the near autonomy in
actual function (despite formal integration) of various branches of the modern
state. Given this, it should not be surprising that during the later years of
the Cold War, the military could act autonomously and terminate the state and even
the world, as Mann (1993) argues it could.
References
Mann, M. (1986). “Societies as organized power networks.” In: M. Mann,
The Sources of Social Power: Volume I: A
history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760 (pp.1-33). Cambridge: CUP.
Available at http://bit.ly/1kwZELI.
Mann, M. (1993). “A theory of the modern state.” In: M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume II: The
rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914 (pp. 44-91). Cambridge: CUP. Available at http://bit.ly/1mbDKh7.
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