What mechanisms are in place to address the problem that the appointment of the Canadian Supreme Court Judges, their decisions, or even their conduct, are, or at least can be, prone to political partisanship and lack of accountability?

The key recent change to the process of appointing judges to the Supreme Court was the ‘creation’ in 2004 of “a formal Advisory Committee on Supreme Court appointments … which is formed each time a vacancy on the Court occurs.”¹ Judging from its structure, the Committee is clearly designed to be as representative of as many different interests, within Canada, as possible. And once this diverse group of representatives is formed, they are tasked with selecting three candidates from the list of seven, given to them by the federal Minister of Justice. Out of the three candidates selected by the Committee, the Prime Minister chooses one, who is then appointed to the Supreme Court.² “Originally, the Committee was prohibited from directly questioning the candidates during its review… In 2006, however, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper signaled that future Committees may have greater access to the candidates…”³

“Parliament created the Canadian Judicial Council in 1971. … [It] was granted power under the Judges Act to investigate complaints made by members of the public and the Attorney General about the conduct (not the decisions) of federally appointed judges. After its investigation of a complaint, the Council can make recommendations, including removing a judge from office.”⁴ However, the Council’s “main purpose is to set policies and provide tools that help the judicial system remain efficient, uniform, and accountable.”⁵

Notes

1. http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/supreme-court-canada-appointment-process#process

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/about_en.asp?selMenu=about_mandate_en.asp

5. Ibid.