Can anything, other than the reserves, provide the military with surge-ability?

A simple, better alternative to reserves, whether when it comes to surge-ability or otherwise, is battlefield contractors. Though no democratic state has yet allowed defense contractors to take on all functions of reserves, the potential is clearly there. Contractors for the US military, for example, are already active on the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they perform a number of essential military functions. The services they provide include reconstruction, logistics and base support, interpreting, advising, and facilities and personal security (Cancian, 2008).

“Contractors provide a number of advantages over military personnel or civil servants—speed of deployment, continuity, reduction of troop requirements, reduction of military casualties, economic inputs to local economies, and, in some cases, executing tasks the military and civilian workforce simply cannot” (Hammes, 2011).

When it comes to achieving cost-effectiveness and surge-ability with battlefield contractors, the way the US government employs them, proves to be highly instructive. The defense contractor, who has been hired for a certain number of years, keeps a list of qualified personnel, willing to be deployed on short notice (Cancian, 2008). Unlike the training and personnel costs associated with reserve units, the services of the contractor, during peacetime, effectively cost nothing to the government. But when the conflict occurs and the military needs quick support, the contractor delivers the required personnel to the required location (Cancian, 2008).

Unlike the military, which often has the policy of rotating its personnel every 6 to 12 months, contractors are often willing to stay in the same battlefield for much longer periods (Hammes, 2011). Defence contracting companies are willing to offer increased pay to those who will stay longer, and many contractors are willing to take that opportunity. Prolonged stay often leads to a better understanding of the situation and better decision making capability (Hammes, 2011).

Defense contractors are also more efficient than the military, since they maintain a much lower support-to-operator ratio; in effect, replacing a certain number of troops with a smaller number of employees (Hammes, 2011). Also, when it comes to battlefield contractor deployment and casualties, there is no real impact on the political aspects of the war. While the reported death toll of the military personnel frequently reduces public support for the war, contractor casualties are not counted in the official death tolls. In present-day democracies “the decision to hire contractors can be taken out of view of the public while decisions to increase troop strength are usually subject to intense debate” (Hammes, 2011).

Defense contracting provides economic inputs into local economies by creating jobs and hiring locals to fill them. And this happens to be an effective method for population-centric counter-insurgency. Moreover, local power structures can be co-opted into supporting the new government through carefully targeted contracts (Hammes, 2011). And finally, locally hired contractors can execute tasks that neither the military nor the civilian workforce can. For example, supply lines to the occupying forces frequently run through highly volatile, highly contested, uncontrolled areas. Consequently, even stationing one’s military to protect them would not be very effective as they would be subjected to constant assaults from all sides. On the other hand, locally hired contractors have shown their ability to maintain such supply lines without any problems, through their combination of force, personal connections, and negotiation skills (Hammes, 2011).

Battlefield contractors, however, do pose some problems which the regular military does not. Quality control is a major issue. While unarmed contractors, employed by the US government to help with the rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan, have often been found guilty of substandard construction, fraud, and theft; armed contractors have been known to be under-equipped and untrained (Hammes, 2011). However, it seems that these problems are temporary. Defence contracting companies that don’t deliver the products and services of the desired quality, will not see their contracts renewed and will soon be out of business; while the government will start hiring only those contractors with a proven record of high quality performance. Moreover, such problems may also be solved, in the short-term, through the drafting of more stringent contracts and/or an enactment of more stringent procurement laws, such that the profits of contracting companies will take a strong hit should they fail to deliver the goods and services at the expected level of quality.

Also there is some risk that armed defense contractors will terrorize and kill civilians of the occupied country, especially if that makes accomplishing their missions easier, and thus cause many political problems to the country that employs them. A few such isolated cases, involving personal security contractors for the US State Department, have occurred (Cancian, 2008). This was however largely due to the fact that they were allowed to operate independently, instead of being under the control of the local US military; as well as because they were neither monitored nor given instructions of what they can and cannot do during their missions, regardless of their objectives or problems they may encounter (Cancian, 2008). Consequently, US government has demonstrated that it is possible to avoid these problems by putting battlefield contractors under the control of the military, having government security officials accompany every convoy, installing video cameras in the vehicles of battlefield contractors, and issuing strict guidelines to contractors regarding what, for the purposes of their job, will constitute allowable and unallowable use of force (Cancian, 2008).

References

Cancian, M. (2008). Contractors: The new element of military force structure. Parameters 38, 61-77. Retrieved from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/uSaWc/Parameters/Articles/08autumn/cancian.pdf.

Hammes, T. X. (2011). Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact. Joint Force Quarterly, 60(1), 26-37. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536906.