- Factors that raise the probability of apprehension of an attacker, “such as topography, strong government, and easily-profiled rebels, limit the targets that an insurgency can aspire to attack without operatives defecting. Conventional insurgency is then limited to low damage activities” (Berman & Laitin, 2008).
- Increasing economic opportunities in the area where insurgents operate will increase the chances of insurgents defecting, especially from suicide missions, because insurgents with strong outside options are far more likely to defect (Berman & Laitin, 2008).
- Since subsidies to terrorist organizations are known to increase the frequency of terrorist acts by such organizations, blocking the transfer of funds to such organizations will reduce their terrorist activities (Berman & Laitin, 2008).
- Since terrorist organizations attract new members and maintain the loyalty of old ones through provision of essential public services to them in areas where the government does not; improving the local provision of identical government or NGO provided public services (so as to create direct competition), to both members and non-members of terrorist organizations, will undermine the support base of terrorist organizations which recruit members from the same territory (Berman & Laitin, 2008). This will of course likely lead to attacks by those terrorist organizations on the government agencies and NGOs that are providing identical public services. So both should be actively protected. A more radical policy along the same lines, with an even greater anti-terrorist effect, would consist of making it illegal for any local ‘clubs’ to provide public goods (Berman & Laitin, 2008).
References
Berman, E. & D.D. Laitin (2008),
“Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model”, J. Public
Economics 92, 1942-1967 http://research.create.usc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=nonpublished_reports.
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